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Drafi Recommendation
on armorrerrts cooperdinn in thefuture construdion of defmce in Europe -
rqily to the annual repofi of the Council
The Asserrbly,
O Considering ttrat a current prioriry for Europe is to improve European defence capabilities;
(ii) Aware that the necessary corollary of a proper European common defence policy is a joint
equipment policy directed towards interoperability if not commonality of equipment for European amred
forces;
(iii) Welcoming recent efforts on the part of the defence sectors of the various European countries to
boost cooperation and in particular the announc€rnexf of the merger between the Aerospatiale Mata and
Dasa groups;
(iv) Stressing that under such circumstances it is becoming increasingly important for European
govemme,ffs to worktogether on armamerfs developmelrt and procurement;
(") Noting with interest the sections of the first part of the 45th annual re,port of the Councit dealing
with armnments cooperation, while regretting the sparseiress of information aboutWEAO;
(i) Predicting that conce,ntation at European level in the supply side of the defeirce equipme,nt mar-
ket will necessitate a similar conce,ntation in articulation of European derrand;
(vi, Considering the welter of existing cooperation stnrctures, the need to avoid the risks of competi-
tion and the urgency of fostering opportrnities for cooperation and rationalisation,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.JNCIL
l. Define minimum equipmed requireme,nts for Europe to be autonomous in security and defence
terms, by evaluating what European nations already have, what they need to produce collectively and
what they must procure outside Europe;
2. Take account of the results of WEU's audit of available assets and capabilities in any work on
harmonising military require,me,lrts undertaken by WEAG, Eurolongterm and other European fora con-
cemed with annrments cooperation;
3. Take early decisions to initiat€ progftlrnmes to address the shortcomings idenffied so as to be in a
position to issue invitations to teirder to European firms;
4. Put paid to the tendency shown by national govenrments to profact unduly or suspe,rd collabora-
tive defence equipment programmes, re,neging on their earlier political commitnents;
5. Srengthen cooperation between WEAG and those services whose responsibility it is to identify
Iong-tenn military requirements;
6. lnform the Assenrbly as to the content of the docume,nt on harrronisation of fuure military re-
quireme,lrts which the Council took note of on 4 May lasq including the recommendations it contains for
follow-on work;
7. Inform the Asserrbly as to the proposals to review Eurolongterm's mandate and the conce,pts en-
visaged for irnproving harmonisation of European nations' future military requirements;
8. Give a more detailed accowrt in its annud report on WEAO development and activities;
9. Inform the Assembly as to plans for strengthening the European armamerfs parbrership and the
rqlercussions thereof for WEAG and WEAO activities;
10. Firm up its political commiment to set up a single European Amulments Agency;
4
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11. Consider how to coordinate WEAG MEAO's work wittr that being done in the LoI and OCCAR
fra:neworks;
12. Work out an appropriate task-sharing :urangeme,ff and strengthen information exchanges be-
twesn WEAG/WEAO and the POLARM Group and the European Commission;
13. Take irnmediate steps towards sening up an institutionalised dialogue between all the armaments
cooperation frameworks by scheduling regular monthly meetings;
14. Agree to set up a "Council of the Wise" consisting of high-leysl independent experts, which, un-
consEained by national interests, can put forward impartial and cohere,nt solutions for rationalistng ex-
isting stnrctures;
15. Keep WEAG's present statrs as an independe,nt forum for as long as WEAG mernber nations
have no guarantee of being able to exercise in full, in any new institutional sructure, the rights they at
presexrt enjoy;
16. Commit itself to drawrng on WEAG know-how and expertise in dweloping a European anna-
ments policy inthe service of the European Security and Defence Identity and the CFSP;
17. Enteat the defence ministers of the WEAG nations to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to become fulI mernbers ofWEAG and WEAO.
18. Give present WEU observers not msmbers of WEAG the opportunity of becoming WEAG fuIl
members;
19. Stengthen and broaden the involvemexft of tlrose WEU associate partrcr counfies ttrat so wish in
arrnaments cooperation-related activities;
20. Envisage, when the time is ripe, forging armaments cooperation links between the European Un-
ion and NATO onttre basis of WEAG expertise and experience.
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Erylanatory Memorandum
(submifieil by Mr O' Eua, Rapporteur)
I.Introduaion
l. Examination of the part afftarnents coop-
eration is likely to play in building the future de-
fence Europe can be boiled down to a few key
questions: what do we have at present? What aim
is ultimately being sought? How can existing co-
operation struc[ures be rationa]ised both from a
functional (allocation of responsibilities between
the various stnrctures) and institutional (multiple
61 singls cooperation suucrure) point of view?
The Assembly has already devoted several re-
ports to answering such questions which are
crucial for the future of defence Europe, the most
recent being ttrat on European cooperation on tlre
procuruners of defence equipment 
- 
lessons drawn
from the Symposium, submiued by Mr Lenzer on
behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
miuee in December 1997, arrd European arma-
mexils restnrcnring and the role of WEU, sub-
miued by Mr Colvin on behalf of the Defence
Commiuee in Dece,rnber 1998.
2. The present seetns a pa:ticularly apposite
momentto consider progrcss made in the various
Europea:r amaments cooperation forums and the
place armaments cooperation has in defence Eur-
ope. The Declaration on sfiengthening the Com-
mon European Security and Defence Policy ad-
opted by the European Council in Cologne on 3
and 4 June could herald ttre start of a process.
Added to whictr, ttre Kosovo crisis has served to
concentate minds on the vital need to develop
credible, autonomous military capabilities. Last-
ly, further atternpts are curently being made to
bring about the conditions necessary for the es-
tablishment of a European Alnuments Agency
(EAA), given that over seven years have elapsed
since the policy proposal for an EAA was first
mooted (see paragraph 121). We must draw the
lessons of earlier stalemates and identify the op-
porrunities now open to Europeans in a political
climate that is inrinsically favourable. Is a single
EAA under European Union auspices a possibil-
ity? What would its membership be and its legal
and institutional framework? What functions
would it have? More generally speaking, would
integration of the many arm:rments cooperation
structures into the European Union be desirable
and if so what practical institutionat adjustnent
would be required: would it involve a single cen-
tralised age,ncy or a federation of agencies under
the aegis oftlre EU?
3. The fust part of the pressnt study of ar-
mame,lts cooperation in the future constuction
of defeirce Europe focuses on two key quesions
that will shape the future. These are, first: the
varisty of cooperation sfiuctures that exist,
which is unlikely to facilitate attempts at ration-
alisation and, second, the ways in which their
respective areas of responsibility interact, gen-
erating at one and the sarne time both a risk of
overlap and opportunities for enhancing coop-
eration. The second part of our study is given
over to an examination of recsnt steps taken in
defence policy and the defence indusury towards
building defence Europe, followed by an analysis
of the work in progress on the European Arma-
me,ils Agency. Lastly, we consider the various
options for the fufiue, post-Cologne, being put
forward for European armaments cooperation.
II. Armaments cooperation: types of
strudures, spheres of action, results and
development prospects
1. Different types of armaments cooperdion
sttudures : memb ership prospects for wider
co operation an d p atut er ship
(a) Membership
4. The main multilateral armaments cooper-
ation structures have different formats, a fact
which has implications for the rationalisation it is
hoped to achieve within defence Europe. In WEU,
2l counties meet as Eurolongterm, Eurocom and
WELG (see paragraphsl9-24). WEAG and
WEAO bnng together 13 member countries and
3 observer counries (see paragraphs 25-34) In
NATO, work on armaments cooperation is car-
ried out by the Atlantic Alliance's 19 menrbers
(see paragraphs 6I-66). ln the European Union
the POLARM and COARM groups (see para-
graphs 35-50) are attended by the 15 merrber
states who are also involved in activities spon-
sored by the European Commission. The Letter
of Intent (see paragraphs 51-55) concenring
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measiures to facilitate the restructuring of the
European defence industry (dated 6 JuIy 1998)
was signed by six European nations. Lastly, four
nations participate in OCCAR (see paragraphs
56-60). Detailed descriptions of all these organi-
sations are given inthe paragraphs indicated.
5. The genesis of the overall architecture of
European a^rrnarrents cooperation is a matter for
question. The various age,ncies involved were
born of political initiatives by government and
their creation was often as a result of stalemate,
or the failure of struchrres set up at an earlier
date. Thus a long line of fallings-out and patch-
ed-up consensus has caused cooperation stuc-
tures to multiply. It *ight almost be said that
their rate of formation is inversely proportional
to the degree of agreement betwee,n European na-
tions. Some represent a need for greater inclus-
ivity, to atEact the widest possible involvsment
and gradually take in all the nations of Europe.
Others are based on smaller groups of countries,
which thereby hope to achieve more and more
substantial progress faster.
6. The functions of EurolongtenrL Eurocom
and WELG, which had been nrn from within the
Eurogroup since 1968, were progressively trarxs-
ferred to WEU n 1993-94. At the same rime.
WEAG replaced the former lndependent Euro-
pean Programme Group (IEPG), which from 1976
had brought together the European members of
NATO, and whose activities were transferred to
WEU in 1993. OCCAR on the other hand was
born of a bilateral Franco-German initiative in
1993. In 1996, Italy and the United Kingdom
formally applied to join OCCAR once it was ser
up in November of ttrat year. As a follow-up to
the idea mooted in Maastricht in 1991 of streng-
thening armaments cooperation with a view to
the creation of a European Armamsnts Agency,
WEAO was set up in 1997 as the precursor to
that Agency. Lastly, the Letter of Intent (LoI)
signed in 1998 is the most rece,fi multilateral
intergovemmental initiative in this sphere. It rep-
resents the culmination of successive initiatives
by defence and industy ministers, initially of
three European countries (France, Germany and
the United Kingdom in Dece,rnber 1997) then five
(the three previously mentioned plus Italy and
Spain in April 1998) and lastly the present six
(Sweden having also signed). OCCAR and the
Lo[ Group appear to derive from the same gen-
eral approach. They are, as it were, "coalitions of
the willing" between ttre countries with the most
clout as far as annnments manufacture in Europe
goes. Should one read into this development a
wish among leading heavyweights to make head-
way more quickly through "enhanced coop-
eration" or even to create a "hard core"? It is
worth remembering ttrat OCCAR nations attemp-
ted to bring that organisation under the WEU
umbrella as a WEU subsidiary body. The move
failed as a result ofobstnrction by several coun-
tries which felt excluded from OCCAR. Hence
OCCAR is to acquire legal personality under an
intemational convention signed in 1998 and now
in the process of raffication by the four counties
involved. Had that integration succeeded, it
would doubtless have created a precedent for "en-
hancd cooperation" over arnumeffs within WEU,
but might also have paved the way for better
cooperation betwesn WEAO's 13 mernbers and
OCCAR's four with a view to the creation of a
future European Armaments Agency.
7. If existing armamslfis cooperation sffuc-
tures are integrated under EU auspices, these dif-
ferences in their shape and composition will also
have to be taken into account.
(b) Prospects for enlargement and partnership
(i) Prospects for enlargement of eristing co-
operation structures
8. LoI: regarding tJre Letter of lntsnt (LoI),
no reference is made to the prospect of extending
this initiative to other European countries. It is
clear nevertheless that since ttre aim of the LoI
was to create the optimum conditions for com-
mercial mergers :rcross Europe's defence and aero-
nautics industries, the involvement of the greatest
number of countries possible would be desirable.
However, given that negotiations "at 6" haye
proved tough enough already, how much more is
this likely to be the case at 13, 15 or more! The
intention of these six countries is apparently to
make as much headway as possible before wid-
ening the discussion to include other European
states.
9. NATO: no new enlargement is envisaged
in the short term. Work on armafirsnts coopera-
tion is carried out by the 19 members. However,
Alliance parmer counties can now be invited to
attend the working groups of the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNADs) except-
ing those dealing with R&T, which are regarded
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as being too se,nsitive. If a working group decides
to open its doors in this way, the invitation ex-
tends to the parurer countries as a whole.
10. OCCAR: the four OCCAR nations do not
view that organisation as an exclusive club, and
it is envisaged ttrat in future mernbership will be
extended to other nations accepting its principles
and willing to adopt an efficient approach to
participation in a major project. The Netherlands
formally declared its interest in October 1997
and applied in April 1999 (see paragpph 59)i.
The Netherlands' application has been accepted
although its actud entry to OCCAR is condi-
tional upon its willingness to participate in a pro-
gramme run by the Organisation. Belgium be-
c:Lme an applicant in March 1998.
11. WEU: within WEU the Eurolongtenr;
Eurocom and WELG groups mest "at 21" but it
is not clear what the position would be whe,n and
if their functions were integrated into the Euro-
pean Union. WEU observer nations that are full
members of tlre European Union could no doubq
if they so wishd become fuIl members of all
three groups. But what of WEU associate mem-
bers that are full members of ELT, Eurocom and
WELG but not EU member states? The same
questions arise in reliation to WEAG and WEAO.
The issue of full participation by WEAO mem-
bers in annaments cooperation activities and
whether these should be tansferred to a single
European Union fra:nework principally concems
Norway, which has twice voted in a referendum
to reject EU entry and Turkey, whose applicant
status is continually being defened.
12. The European Union: within the frame-
work of anticipated EU enlargement, new coun-
ries will eventually take part in the work of the
POLARM and COARM groups and in European
Commission activities. Accession negotiations
began in March 1998 with the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, and also with Estonia and
il.c-oou*tionwherebylegalpenonalityisconf erred
upon OCCA\ which was signed bD, the fou Ddence
Ministers in Farnborough on 9 September 1998, con-
tains one importart irnorration: the imoduction of
flexrble decision-making nacttnery, which takes ac-
count, in line with qpecific n:les, of the influence of the
various states in OCCAR With OCCAR enlargerrcnt
in view, this should make it posible o presenre the
main European armamefis prodrcer comtries' stake in
the organisation
Sloveni4 which are among applicants regarded
as frontnrnners. Similarly, Latsia, Lithuania and
the Slovak Republic could meei the Copathagen
criteria between now and 2000, which would
mean that they too would be allowed to begin ac-
cession negotiations. Moreover, all other WEU
associate parbxer counties applying for member-
ship of the European Union (Bulgaria Romania)
will sooner or later be in a position to join.
(ii) European Armaments Partnership (EAP)
13. On 19 October 1995 in Ostend the minis-
ters agreed to examine the issue of a European
Amaments Partrrcrship (EAP). Non-WEAG Eure'
pean Union member countries could become in-
volved, on a case-by-que basis, as informal ob-
servers in the work of the WEAG panels. Some
associate parmers expressed an interest in being
involved in WEAG armaments cooperation act-
ivities.
14. In Erfurt, on 18 Nove,mber 1997, the de-
fence ministers of the 13 WEAG nations ageed
to esexd those coumies' involvemem in WEAG.
WEU observers are thus able to take part in all
WEAG meetings if they so wish. As far as asso-
ciate partrers are concemd WEAG panels and
their sub-groups decide in respect of each agenda
item whetler parurership is open to them. Where
appropriate, associate partrrcrs may be invited to
participate in National Arruxnelrts Directors'
(NADs) and ministerial meetings. If it is decided
that an observer or associate par0rer is to take
part in a specific annaments projecL the nation
concemed is involved in the project on the same
basis as WEU fi:ll merrbers, including contib-
ution of an appropriate financial share2.
15. In 1998, trruo significant st€,ps forward
were taken in enhancing European Arftlments
Parmership. A Memorandum of Undersanding
(MoI) concerning the mutual use of govemment
test facilities was drafted by the 13 WEAG
countries and Finland and Swede,r:" to facilitate
access to and more effective use of such facili-
ties. [n temrs of participation in research and
technology progammes, WEAG defence minis-
ters signed an MoU known as SOCRATE (Sys-
tem of Cooperation for Research and Technology
in Europe) which made it possible for partici-
pation in such programmes to be exended in the
fust instance to Finland and Sweden with the
' 
S." emrn oeclaratio4 paragraph,l0.
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possibility of a further exte,nsion to other coun-
ties such as Austria. Both MoUs were signed in
Rome on 16 Novernber 1998 by the 13 WEAG
defence ministers and the defence ministers of
Finland and Sweden.
L6. Since then the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland have become members of NATO,
and zubsequently WEU associate mernbers. At
their meeting in Rome in November 1998, the
ministers of the WEAG countries had already
considered the need to explore this new relation-
ship and tasked the NADs to examine the issue
furttrer and propose a possible WEAG position
for consideration. In addition, at their spnng
1999 meeting in Athens, the NADs announced
that were in favour, in principle, of accession by
WEU observers and associate members to the
stanrs of WEAG full member. They tasked the
StaffGroup to examine this issue further and put
forward a WEAG position at the autumn meeting
with a view to a decision by WEAG ministers in
November.
17. Thereforg it can be e4pected that at their
meeting in November, WEAG defence ministers
will agree on a revision of the arrangements for
the European Armaments Partrership decided in
1997 so as to:
enable the three new WEU associate
members to participate in WEAG ac-
tivities;
open up the possibilrty for presexrt
WEU observers who are not me,mbers
of WEAGto become fulIme,mbers.
The accession of those nations to WEAG full
menrbership would essentially require their ac-
ceptance of the WEAG3 acquis, namely:
ageed WEAG objectives;
ageed WEAG principles, including the
six key principlesa agreed for the tans-
fer of IEPG functions to WEU;
Fc i. made up of ttree Panels: Panel I 
- 
Joim
Programmes and Equipmenq Panel tr 
- 
Research and
Technolog6 Panel Itr 
- 
Procedures and Economic
N4afiers (see paragrapts 25-27).
a Those principles essentiatty state that: the 13 nations
are entitled to participate fi:lly and with the same rigbas
and reqponsibilitic in any Euopean armaments cc.
op€ration fonrm; there must be a single body for Euro-
pean armaments cooeeratioq armaments coceeration
- 
the IEPG 1990 Policy Documenq
- 
the Panel I Equipmelrt Review Process
(see paragraph2S\;
- 
the EUCLID, TFIALES and SOCRATE
MoUs (see paragraphs 3l-34);
Panel [I specific procedures such as
Eurofinder (see paragraph 33);
- 
the Test Facilities MoU (see paragraph
3$;
Panel Itr docume,na for implementing
the European Defe,nce Equipment Mar-
ket @DEM) (see paragraph 27);
- 
the aim of establishing a European Ar-
mimerxts Agency;
- 





theWEAO Charter and MoU;
sections on il[uments cooperation in
WEU ministerial Declarations.
Accession would also require their participation
in the WEAG operational budget.
18. Although the multiplicity of European
frameworks for cooperation threate,:rs to create
an obstacle to sfiex€thening armamerfs coopera-
tion in defflrce Europe, the prospects of wider
cooperation and partrership must inevitably fa-
cilitate rationalisation. The choice between the
widest possible participation and flo<ible in-
volvement with the possibility of emhanced coop-
eration will be a crucial one forthe future.
2, Armaments cooperdion strudures :
ftelds of aaion,work andproqteds
(a) Activities and achievements
Eurocom, WELG, Eurolongterm
19. Eurocom promotes interoperability be-
tween tactical communications systems of the
member countries' land forces, at the direction of
defe,nce ministers. Its subsidiary aim is to exploit
-tiriti"r should be managed by the National Arma-
ments Directors of the 13 nations, who will be ac-
countable to their countries' defence midsters; the ex-
isting links with EDIG and NATO are to be main-
tained-
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opportunities for interdepe,ndence in systems and
equipment development and production, thereby
making the best use of national resources. Con-
sequently, Eurocom has promoted communica-
tions interoperability by agreeing the operational
requireme,nts, system paramsters and test specifi-
cations recorded in some baseline documents.
20. The Western European Logistics Group
$IELG) fosters closer cooperation among mem-
ber nations over logistic support for their armed
forces, also at the direction of defence ministers.
It does so by coordinating, rationalising and stan-
dardisrng member nations' logrstic support cap-
abilities and assets wherever appropriate. WELG
has produced documentation and agreements that
are useful (e.g. the Communications-Electronics
Battle-Da:nage Repair and Preve,lrtion Manual in
1997, a Joint Logistic Support Concept for the
WEU, a Mutual Emergency Supply and Support
Memorandum of Understanding, covering sup-
port for air forces, signed by most nations). Less
tangible, but nevertheless important, WELG's
work has made it possible to achieve greatr;r
mutual understanding of msnber nations' logistic
situations, policies and structures and it has had
a mea$ue of influe,nce as a group within NATO,
thus supporting the achievement of a European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).
21. Of the tlree groups, Eurolongterm is of
particular importance in terms of armaments co-
operation bstween European nations. The aims of
Eurolonglerm are to promote effective long-term
military planning and to establish a finrrer base
for international cooperation in the field of de-
fence equipmenq at the direction of defsnce min-
isters. ELT develops planning concepts and
thence mission-needs documents to be used for
national planning. Eurolongterm is made up of a
Steering Group and three sub-groups, dealing
with Lan{ Air and Sea matters, which meet
twice a year. It has no pennanent sta^ff and holds
only two sessions per year.
22. ELT has completed ttre Eurolongterm
Snrdy on Multinational Task-sharing within the
Petersberg Mission Spectnrm OINTS Study),
initiated by the CHODs and subsequently ap-
proved by the Perrranent Council in September
1995. While detailed recommendations were set
out in the ELT sub-group annexes, the Steering
Group took the libercy of pointing to ts/o generic
and four specific joint areas (considered promis-
ing for multinational task-sharing) and of inviting
higher authorities to commrssion further daailed
work onthese areas. ELT is still awaiting further
feedback or any follow-up that higher authorities
may choose to provide.
23. ELT is not structuredto undertake detailed
or quick-reaction work. A number of measures
are envisaged to make it more efficient. Its Terms
of Reference are currently being redefined and
should be approved in Luxembourg in Novem-
ber. Atthe end of September 1999, Eurolongterm
acquired a permanent Secretariat, tlre same as
was recently created for Eurocom within WEU.
If the new Terms of Reference arc accepte4 the
number of meetings it holds per year could be
increased to six. An effort is also being made to
raise the level of its experts (to that of Colonel
for the exeerts *tsmselves and General in the
case of the Chairman ofttre Steering Group, who
coutd also be based permanently in Brussels).
The relationship between WEAG and ELT is to
be strengthened. A paper, "Principles and Proce-
dures for the definitiorq developme,trt and acqui-
sition of operational w%pons systerrs for the
WEAG nations" is currently being dra.fted. This
unprecede,nted document constitutes a detailed
manual of the links to be maintained between
WEAG Panels I and II, industry and ELT.
24. It appears ELT is at a decisive turning-
point in its history. The lack of military inpuq
advice or initiative from the Military Delegates
Committee (MDC) and the Military Commiuee
(MC) must be assessed as a major deficiency for
the functioning and necessary policy generation
and coordination of the Eurogroups. This defi-
ciency has remained unresolved since the tansfer
took place n 1993-94. It is for WEU govem-
melrts to encourage development of the Euro-
groups, especially ELT, by carrying out all the
reforms referred to previously. The Permanent
Council of WEU could decide that the MDC
could be responsible for policy ganeration and
coordination for Eurocom, WELG and Eurolong-
term. This would include in particular (a) evil-
uating the work of those groups; (b) generaaag
tasking and initiatives and./or defining areas of
work for these groups in line with WEU concepts
and other planning activities to be approved by
the CHODs; (c) morutrling the implerrentation
of CHODs' tasking to these groups. The audit of
available assets and capabilities for operations
carried out by European countries, the results of
l0
DOCLIMENT 1671
which are to be submiued to the Luxernbourg
WEU ministerial meeting coul4 for example,
serye as a basis for ELT's future work. WEU
could become the official centre for harmonising
European operational requirements with a sub-
goup responsible for matching force needs to
future military situations, evaluating operational
requirements for standardisation and interoper-
ability at the multinational level and proposlng
common operational specifications for the requis-
ite equipmenC. Only through a firm political
resolve, enunciated at high level can ELT's role
acquire the scope for strengthening arnaments
cooperation between European counEies in any
essential way.
WEAG6
WEAG operates through 3 panels:
25. Panel I seeks to promote cost-effective
cooperative equipment proglammes which fuIfil
WEAG nations' military requireme,nts. To ach-
ieve this goal, Panel I makes an annual com-
parison of WEAG nations' equipment replace-
ment schedules (ERS). When an opportunity for
cooperation arises, a group of specialists made
up of representatives of the countries involved is
set up to standardise the requirements of Euro-
pean headquarters so that collaboration between
those countries over the development and pro-
duction phases can proceed. Panel I monitors and
facilitates the work of the specialist groups, re-
ports back to the NADs and puts forward re-
commendations. Eight projects are currartly in
hand under Panel I auspices and ten specialist
groups are looking at the possibilities of coop-
eration over other projects. The Cooperation Op-
pornrnity Consultation Office (COCO) provides
information to countries searching for partners
for specific projects. It should be noted that al-
though projects are generated from within Panel
I, while there is no EAA, they move out of
WEAG's orbit as soon as they take shape. This
' '"Iowards a European weapons procurement process",
Keith llaywar( Chaillot Papers 2'1, Jltre 1997, WEU
Insitute for Security Strdies.
6 For f,rther inforrnation on the origins of WEAG see
Asseribly Document 1483 *WEAG, the way to be
followed" report s-Ubmitted on behalf of the Tech-
nological and Aeroqpace Committee by Mrs Guirado
and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs, November 1995.
prevents coordination of the various European
programmes from taking place aad the accumu-
lation of a body of experience on how coopera-
tion procedures and machinery work.
26. Panel [I deals with Research and Technol-
ogy and cooperative programmes. The EUCLID
programme, involving industry and research in-
stitutes, is curre,ntly the main instumsnt for pur-
suing this task. Some 86 specific Research and
Technology projects have been completed in the
13 Common European Priority Areas (CEPA)
ttrat are active at present. In the field of scie,nce
and technology, in 1996 and 1997, WEAG's
Panel II carried out research into a global strat-
egy for science and technology issues for the de-
fence market in Europe (Science and Technology
Strategy (SCITEC) Study). The industry, as tlrc
originator of the SCITEC study has been exten-
sively involved in the exercise. Technical Case
Studies are now being carried out with a view to
science and technology strategies being put for-
ward in several chosen areas, in particular opti-
cal materials and information processing. A
Panel II report on the conclusions of those stud-
ies is scheduled to be submitted to the NADs in
March 2000. Panel tr also intends to prepare an
annual WEAG research programme (PRAG) as
from the same date.
27. Panel Itr is in charge ofprocedures and
economic matters and the European Defence
Equipment Market (EDEIO. This panel deals
with major aspects of a Common Defence Eco-
nomics Policy and with annaments cooperation
procedures. A reorganisation of Panel [II sub-
groups is under way which will lead to the crea-
tion of tlree sub-commifiees, one dealing with
EDEM on demand rationalisatiorg a second deal-
,ng with the Defence Indusfial and Technolog-
ical Base (DITB) on rationalisation of supply
and a third on countries with a developing de-
fence industry (DDI).
28. The WEAG Group of National Experts on
the Masterplan for the European Armaments
Agency is tasked to put forward proposals for
principles, policies, nrles, regulations and proce-
dures to govern work of the EAA" according to
the Masterplan for the European Armaments
Agency agreed by the defence ministers on 17
November 1998. Its current work is the subject




29. The European Defence Industies Group
which brings together the national associations of
WEAG me,mber counries defence industies acts
as technical adviser to the WEAG authorities and
attelds most WEAG Panel meetings as an ob-
seryer. The missions and objectives assigned to
EDIG are:
- 
to carry out and coordinate all studies
on sciernifig technical, economic and in-
stitutional aspects of any matters of
corlmon interest to the European de-
fence industry;
- 
to give advice and recomme,ndations to
European govenrmelrts on policies and
other matters of interest to the Euro-
pean defence industry;
- 
to see\ on a European scale, appro-
priate solutions to the problems of the
European defence industry;
- 
to re,present all its members, particu-
larly in relafions with the Westem Eur-
opean Armaments Group, which recog-
nises EDIG as the focus for the views
of the European defe,nce indusry. Each
national industry goup has appointed a
national represemtative for EDIG matters.
30. While WEAG docume,nts are approved by
the NADs, and in some cases defe,nce ministers,
they are not legally binding. Their implernenta-
tion ttrerefore depeirds on the political goodwill of
each individual WEAG me,mber stat€. I1 also
suffers from the lack of a pernume,ft structure.
The national experts in charge of WEAG's work
have limited availability, which prevents them
devoting themselves exclusively to the organisa-
tion's activities. High-Ievel meoings are poorly
attexlded. What is more, National Armaments
Directors have not always and everywhere the
szlme responsibilities and authority in their home
counties, a lack of homoge,neity that hinders the
decision-making process. There is, regrettably,
an abse,lrce sf high-profile political support ard
lack of interest in WEAG's activities on the part
of national authorities and therein lies WEAG's
main s,reaknsss. More fundamentally, national
interests re,main to the fore and there continues to
be wide disparity between European nations,
particularly in tenns of the proportion of the de-
fence budget devoted to military equipment and
R&D (see paragraph 99).
WEAO
31. A Charter for the Westem European Ar-
mam€nts Organisation (WEAO) was agreed by
the WEAG defence ministers and adopted by the
WEU Council of Ministers in autumn 1996. Un-
der this Charter the Research Cell (RC) as the
initial executive body of WEAO, set up in April
1997 as a subsidiary body of WEU, has legal
personality and is able to confract for R&T ac-
tivities handed over by the nations through
WEAG's Panel tr and its working bodies. The
EUCLID progamme aims to develop and extend
the defence technology base of the governments
and industries of the WEAG nations. It also aims
to optimise available resources.
32. WEAO mernber states involved in an
R&T project (RTP) produce Implementing Ar-
rangemexts documents (IA) which are then
passed to the Research Cell. The Research Cell's
Iegal personallty as a WEU subsidiary body al-
lows it to contract with indusries or research
institutes. Research and Technology bids put
forward by industry are evaluated through the
machinery of the Eurofinder Symposia whereby
industries meet with Panel tr and Common Euro-
pean Priority Areas (CEPA) rspresentatives. Co-
operation between govenrment research estab-
lishments is facilitated by the THALES (Tech-
nology Arrangerrent for Laboratories for defe,nce
European Science) MoU. However, the number
of THALES projects has not reached the target
of five fixed by the NADs in October 1998. In
terms of R&T partnerships, the introduction of
the SOCRATE (System of Cooperation for
Research and Technology in Europe) measrues
made it possible to ext€nd access to WEAG-
sponsored research projects to Finland and Swe-
den, which are not members of WEAO, tlrough
WEAO -notifi ed conracts.
33. ln the first part of the 45th annual rsport
of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's
activities (l January 
- 
30 June 1999)7 the activi-
ties of the Research Cell are referred to in two
paragraphs too succinct to constitute an accurate
evaluation of the success or ottrerwise of the
work of this important body and where its future
direction lies. We are told nonetheless that in the
first six months of 1999 the Research Cell noti-
fied eight EUCLID St€p 2 contacts to European
7a.."-Uty pocrunent 1661, 20 September 1 999.
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industry representing a conribution by govern-
me,nt of €25 million and an additional industry
contribution of €15 million. Since sunmer 1997,
the WEAO Research Cell has awarded a total of
30 research coffiacts (4 n 1997, t3 in 1998 and
13 in the first ten months of 1999 as well as nine
study or service confracts. The Cell forecasts an
average annual figure of 15 contacts per year,
two-thirds of such projects by way of the
Eurofinder procedure8 sst up by the indusry.
Annual amounts available under the EUCLID
programme are of the order of €65 million (one
third being met from funding from the industry).
The European indusury's response to the Euro-
finder 1999 cycle has been encouraging:22bids
have bee,n received. The CeIl plans to create an
industrial database. The procedures for awarding
contracts have been speeded up. All that remains
is to is to step up funding for WEAG (roughly
2%o of European R&D budgets) so that WEAG/
WEAO will be the European cooperation forum
"par excelle,nce" in this respecf .
34. The idea of cross-linking all European
defence R&T initiatives is currently taking shape




taking for Research Organisation, Programmes
and Activities). This would entail reactivating
and rationalising WEAG 
^rEAO 
R&D work
curre,ntly being undertaken under the EUCLID,
THALES AND SOCRATE MoUs and that on
the shared use of test facilities. It is also pla::ned
to involve other fora with R&T responsibilities,
such as OCCA& the LoI Working Group or the
forum consisting of the four Directors of Re-
search (France, Germany, the Nstherlands and
the United Kingdom). Lastly there is scope for
greia;til flexibility in the EUCLID system: wittr
regard to, for example, (a) the absolute right of
every county to join the programme of its
choosing; (b) m "equal shares" burden-sharing
systern arid (c) provisions covering intellecrual
properly rights which it is known are barely sat-
isfactory to the industry. It is envisaged that
% e*"n"d* mechanism was conceived to enable
miltinational consortia to submit qpontaneous proposals
withinthe framework of the now finely honed EUCLID
@uropean Cooperation for the Inng Term in Defence)
progamme. It operates in parallel with the pre
gramme's nonnal funplememation procedureg where
the initiative lies with governmens.
' See Rome Declaration, paragraph I l.
groups of counfiies may form par0rerships in
order to undertake bilateral or multilateral re-
search activities. This idea is meeting with resis-
tance from some WEAG countries, particularly
those with a developing defence industy (DDI).
However, most R&T acuvity in Europe is al-
ready going on in the context of "closed pro-
grammes". The ELIROPA MoU, which should
come within the WEAO Charter and MoU, at
least allowed all WEAG parfircrs the possibility
to access the information necessary for their par-
ticipation in the projects that interested them by
virnre of the principle of transparency. The idea
of a cenaalised research fund wittr sums "ear-
marked" nationally for counaies' own projects
has surfaced once again. The ELJROPA Memor-
andum might also offer a framework for exam-
ining future EAA Research and Technology re-
quirements.
EU (POLARM, COARM, Dual-use Goods
Group and the European Commission)
35. During the work on the drafting of the
Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, ar-
milments manufacture and trade were exempted
from the rules of the common market. Article
223 has since been included in the different trea-
ties which have succeeded the Rome Treatylo
(and has become Article 296 n the Treaty on
European Union). This article has allowed mem-
ber stat€s to rstain national contol ovor &ilrur-
ments and security matters including matters
over which the Community has an exclusive
purview, for example customs duties. States have
tended to interpret this provision very widely
even though it merely gives them the power to
invoke exemption of internal market rules for
defence-related products. The Community played
a very limited part in relation to the defence sec-
tor until 1990. Since therU in view of the worsen-
ing situation in the defence sector, its intervelrtion
on an increased scale came to be seen as neces-
sary. Europe's srategy on defmce is the object
of serious and wide-ranging examination.
36. The notion of security invoked in Title V
of the Maastricht Treaty was sufficiantly com-
prehensive as to encomptrss armnments issues.
Nevertheless it was not until 1995 that the debate
became politically charged. On 30 June 1995, an
infonnal group of countries under the joint lead
\-* A...-bty Document 1623, paragraphs 3840.
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ership of the counaies holding the EU and WEU
presidencies, in conjunction with the country
fuslrling the WEAG presidency, produced a study
docume,nq proposlng options, recomme,ndations
and suggestions for the development of a Euro-
pean armiments policy. Since Amsterdanr, Art-
icle 17.1 (fourth inden0 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEI, explicitly provides that 'tle
progressive ftaming of a defence policy will be
supported, as Member States consider appropri-
ate, by cooperation between them in the field of
armameints".
37. The Ad Hoc European Armamexfs Policy
Group (POLARM) created in 1995 works di-
rectly to the Committee of Pennanelrt Represe,n-
tatives (COREPER). The goup mests three
times during any one presidency, i.e. six times a
year. It is made up of foreign minisry rq)resen-
tatives who are usually accompanied by defence
ministry experts. Its initial mandate sets out three
precise tasks, namely to:
analyse the report drafted by the infor-
mal Group of E:perts responsible for
shrdying ttre options for a European
afinaments policy;
identify the points in the report which
warrant further examination within the
European Union framework; and
- 
make recommendations for further ac-
tion within the Community framework
or within thb frarnework of Title V of
the TEU an{ as appropriate, put for-
ward a list of specific measures without
prejudice to the Commission's compe-
tence under the Treaty on the European
Community.
38. The POLARM Group submitted its fust
interim report on its activities to COREPER at a
meeting held on 19 June 1996. Following that
meeting it considered several specific issues. Re-
garding definition of the specific characteristics
of the defence-related secoor, tlre group drafted
an agreed text on 22 Novemrber 1996. It also
considered a draft common position, submitted
bythe Commission and, in particular, the follow-
ing three points:
- 
the possibility of simpliffing controls
over infia-Community arms transfers
(and tansfers of other defence-related
products). Discussions on this subject
are making progress. The Cornmission
is preparing a legal position on inta-
Comrnunity transfers for POLARM's
attortion;
open public tendering in defe,lrce sec-
tors. Discussions are continuing on this
issue without an ageed tcxt having
been reached at pres€xtt.
- 
the area of "supply guarantees"ll.
39. Since 1995, POLARM's work has been
deadlocked through lack of consensus. There is a
fundamental difference of approach betwee,n
those who advocate retaining cooperation policy
in its present form and those in favour of the
gradual inroduction of a European armzrme,nts
policy. There are also differences in attitude be-
tween those who support a preponderant role for
govemments and government control and those
who want to allow the defence industry great€r
freedom of initiative through the elimination of
all barriers to competition. The draft common
position has bee,n on the agsnda since 1997. Art-
icle I recognises the particular characteristics of
the defence sector while Article 2 takes the view
ttrat developme,nt of an effective European arma-
ments policy implies the use of insruments that
are the province both of the CFSP and the Com-
munity framework. Article 5 proposes the adop-
tion at the earliest possible opporcunity of appro-
priate measures, as follows, in relation to:
(a) movenem of goods: a simplified sys-
tem that can be applied to all intra-Com-
munity tansfers where export and re-ex-
port guarantees are involved, together wittt
monitoring and contol machinery; prin-
ciples, rules and snforcernelil machinery
for transparency and nondiscrimination in
procurement, based on existing commu-
nity nrles governing public contacts;
(b) customs regulations: the Council
would undertake to draw up a common list
of goods that might be exe,rnpted from the
common customs tarifl taking account of
mernber states' defence requirements and
-\t 
i. rrp to natiors to ascertain @articularly when it
comes to the sening up of a Transnational Defence
Company) that all the necessary conditions allowing
themto take delivery of the defence goods and sendces
they require to fl:lfil tteir military engagements are
mafuained- See also paragraph 52.
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the advantages to be gained by fostering
the development of a European armamexts
policy.
40. Work was done on the common position
under the British, Austrian and German Presi-
dencies but to be adopted it requires unanimity.
This is so far not forthcoming. Under the Fimish
Presidency a new submission of a text relatively
close to that of the original corlmon position was
envisaged, with the hope of a possible consensus
being reached after Cologne. The Finnish Presi-
dency, which is very anxious to achieve that con-
sensus may even call for high-level political con-
sultations to make progress. The present un-
precedented political resolve within POLARM to
make cooperation work is counterbalanced by
continuing administrative opposition and sectoral
vested interests. In the we,lrt of its being adopted
by the Council, the common position could have
very considerable political importance. It would
give a clear signal to the European defence indus-
try with regard to the major new role states were
readyto seethe European Union assume in defin-
ing a European armame,rfs policy. The Union
would become a highly visible defence-indusury
interlocutor. The adoption of the document could
also have legal repercussions and provide yet
further justification for restrioive interpretation
of Article 296 of the Treaty on European Union
(see paragraph 35).
41. The Conve,ntional Arms Exports Working
Group (COARM) is an ad hoc grotp set up
when the Maasricht Treaty came into force, and
answerable to COREPER. This group also meets
three times dunng any one presidency, i.e. six
times a year. It is made up of forergn ministry
represe,:rtatives who are usually accompanied by
defence ministry e)(eerts. The work of COARM
relat€s to harmonisation of export policies to
third countries based on the overall framework of
the eight criterial2 defined in Luxembourg (29
June t99l) and Lisbon (26 aad27 lurrc 1992).
Export decisions are based on these criteri4 the
ultimate aim of which is a harmonised joint ap-
proach to arns e)iport policy. The Group's ob-
jective is to agree common practices for all EU
countries. The application of such principles re-
mains the responsibility ofthe individual nations.
COARM is the originator of a side document on
ffiry oocnmem t623, pngrq}- 46.
inra-Community arms fiansfersl3 (although it is
applied rarely or not at all by the member states,
which frequently prefer to implernent their own
national legislation). In June 1998, after a study
carried out by COARM, the EU Council adopted
a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, laying
down eight criteria that were to apply. The Code
seeks to sfiengthen joint export criteria, and
through consultation machinery to reduce diver-
gence in national export decisions. It contains the
agreed practice on the implementation of the
Code of Conduct. This latter makes reference to
a list of products, now almost finalised, to which
ttre criteria laid down in the Code of Conduct are
to apply. Discussions are continuing over certain
products to decide whether they are to be in-
cluded or not in the list (for example some pro-
ducts whose use is not exclusively military, such
as anti-riot equipment).
42. Overall the results of COARM's work
have bee,n positive and have led to agreeme,nt on
common export criteria for an agreed list of pro-
ducts and regular consultations over the practices
ageed. Its work is now mainly focusing on
arriving at a definition of an "esse,ntially identical
tansactiod' and on technical details such as
arangeme,lrts for notiffing refusal to export from
one me,nrber state to another. The philosophy of
the group remains the common minimum consexr-
sus. There is a clear parallel between the work of
COARM and the Lo[ Group deahng with export
procedures. [t would be inrcresting if the LoI
Group were to pass on the results of its own
worktothe COARM group.
43. As far as control of exports of dual-use
goods and technologies is concerned, an ad hoc
"dual-use" group exiss. [n Decenrber 1994, on a
proposal from the Commission, the Council ad-
opted a system of contol based on a regulation
underpinned by Article 133 of the Treaty on
European Union (dealrng with common commer-
cial policy, see also paragraph 48) and a joint
measure under the CFSP framework. This
'trans-pillar"la system which came into force in
1995 provides an interesting compromise solu-
tion. Member states use joint me:Nures to iden-
-" 
soparagaprr+g.la Trans-pillar qystem: one whose implernenution
dqends on both the cornmon provisiors of the first (so-




tis the list of products concerned while the ex-
port conaol mechanism itself is covered by the
common provisions. According to ts/o judgmexfs
of the European Court of Justicer5 handed down
n 1997, dual-use products falt within the sphere
of application of the Common Commercial Pol-
icy and are not limit€d by Article 296 of the
Treaty on European Unio4 barring specific ex-
ceptions. These decisions therefore strengthen the
Commission's hand. However some me,nrber
states are reluctant to count€,nance this, even if
the judgpents of the Court of Justice leave them
little room for manoeurne. This issue is politi-
cally very se,nsitive .
44. Within the first pillar, the Commission has
an exclusive right of proposal. Within the second
pillar, that of the Common Forergn and Security
Policy (CFSP) where the procedures of intergov-
ernme,ntal coope'ration apply, the Commission
only has full associated parher status. It takes
part in the debates, can put forward ame,ndments
and is not alone in being able to put forward pro-
posals. It is seeking to encourage mergers be-
twee,lr industrial players and to pre,pile suitable
legislative frarneworks for such msrgers. Legs-
lative proposals within the framework of the
common provisions relate principally to:
setting up an internal armaments rrulr-




applying competitive tendering proce-
dures to public confiacts for defence
goods (allowing a reasonable :Imount
of flexibility so as to take account of
the special circumstances of the de-
fence sector, particularly require,me,lrts
relating to secrecy and security of sup-
plr.
Clearly the application of competition policy to
the defence goods sector is one of the most politi-
cally sensitive and technically complex of the
proposals advanced by the Commission. The
Commission is proposing specifically that two
measures taking account of the specificities of
the defence sector should be applied: tlrc regula-
tion on contol over mergers and an exte,nsion of
B c.luead,C-831g4
Community control over state aid to the defence
sector of indusury.
45. Another important aspect deatt with by the
Commission under the CRDP is Technology Re-
search and Developme,nt. In view of the increas-
ing number of dual-use technologies, the Com-
mission could help improve the defence techno-
logical base and defe,nce indusqy competitive-
ness. It could use the strucural funds to assist
the defence industry in restruchrring at regional
level.
46. Lastly, in the framework of its industrial
policy, it could apply its e:perience in standardi-
sation and tecbnical harmonisation to promote
the use of cornmon industrial standards in pro-
grarnmes for defe,nce goods.
47. In January 1995, the Commission pub-
lished communication (COM (96) t0 final) on
"The challenges facing the European defence-
related indusury 
- 
confibution for action at
European level", setting down the broad guide-
lines for EU action. The strategy outlined in this
document was approved by the European Parl-
iament which adopted a resolution in spring 1997
in support of the Commission's view. In Septem-
ber 1997 the Commission published a further
communication on '"The European a.erospace
industry: 'Meeting the Global Qhallsxrgs' (COM
(97) 446 final) an4 in Dece,mber 1997, yet a
third cornmunication was published on "Imple-
menting European Union stratery on defence-
related industries" (COM (97) 583 final), which
was se,ft to the Council, the European Parlia-
men! the Economic and Social Commitee and
the Committee for the Regions. It contained a
dra.ft common position on the wording of a Euro-
pean armaments policy, to be adopted by the
Council pursuant to Article 1216 of the Treaty on
European Union, along with a plan of action in-
tsnded to foster the e,mergence of a European de-
fence industry and armaments market. The draft
common position is currently being snrdied by
POLARM (see paragraphs 3840).
@iue v: Prrovisions ona commonForeignand
Security Policy: Artide 12: "The Union shall pursue the
objectives set out in Article 11 by defining the pdn-
ciples ofand general guidelines for the corunon foreign
and secudty polic$ deciding on corunon strategies;
adopting joint actions; adopting corunon positions;
srrengthening systematic cooperation between Merrber
States inthe conduct ofpoliq/'.
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48. The current situation as regards the prin-
cipal measures advocated by the European
Commission's plan of action for defence-related
industries is as followslT:
Inta-Community transfers: two ex-
perts' meoings were held during sum-
mer 1999. The Commission's services
should soon submit a new working pa-
per which will then be discussed in ttre
Council's POLARM Group. AlthoWh
this is the area on which there is most
agreexnexf in POLARM, there is as yet
no agreeme,l$ on the :urangemerfs for
effecting such transfers. The Commis-
sion's services have, however, made in-
formal contacts with national experts in
this connection. This will be the fust
subject for consideration if the common
position is adopted in COREPER. The
work which the LoI Group has in hand
on inta-Communiry tansfers and that
of the Commission may well prove to
be compleme,ntary and hence the
agreexnents reached between the six LoI
counties may be acceptable to the 15
EU me,nrber states. If those agreements
were fransposed to the EU, they would
have the support of the Commission's
legislative machinery (but see para-
gaphs 5t-55).
Status of the European transnational
company: this idea is hardly a new one
and dates backto the 1970s. A draft di-
rective is pending with the Council be-
cause of a stalsmate on the :urange-
ments for worker participation. This is-
sue is, however, less of a priority in the
defence sector than in other industries.
This is because the industry has other
mqrns of making arrangemsnts for
working together.
Public confiacts for defence goods: it
would be possible for the Commission
to propose rules to apply to defence
sector public contacm on the basis of
the existing directive on public con-
tacts. In its plan of actionlE the Com-
ffi.* *iu European Commission services.
18 Plan of action for defence-related indr:stries @uro-
pean Commission, Pafl V.3) (COM 9A 583 final, 4
December 199n. A distinaion is made between /r)
mission had suggested adjusting the
entire body of ruIes applymg to te,nders
to the specificities of the defence sector.
Defence goods for this purpose were
regarded as falling into three catego-
ries. Although the Commission services
are continuing with the worlg there
have as yet been no discussions with
national experts.
Technology Research and Development
(TRD): notwithsanding EUCLID's
€70 million annual budget, the Com-
munity framework has a four-year bud-
get of €,14.7 billion. Give,n that a third
of the research funded through the
Community fiamework is in dual-use
areas, the future CRDP could be devel-
oped so as to dovetail better with na-
tional and European defence technology
TRD prograrmes.
Standardisation: the study envisaged in
the timetable of the plan of action has
just been completed. The next step is to
identify a uniform set of standards for
defence equipment prograurmes. Such
corrmon standards, established to fa-
cilitate homogeneity across the market,
are a long-term project. Standards laid
down in fora such as WEAG and
OCCAR will also need to be taken into
account.
Customs duty: re-examination of the
Commission's 1988 proposal on te,m-
porary suspe,nsion of import duty is
still pending wittrthe Council.
lnnovation, technology tansfer and
small and medium-sized businesses: the
Commissiorq tbrough DG )il (science,
goods for armed forces', bW not military, use, and
therdore subject to the common provisions gwerning
public tendem; (ii) gcrds for miliury use by the armed
forces, which do not frX ifio the "higtrly-sensitive"
defence equipme,rt category to which a fairly flexible
body of rules drawing on the same corunon provisions
apply and (iii) htdhly sensitive defence equipmeml
which cornes within the qphae of application of Article
223/296 of the TEU, which conld be orempted from the
above nrles where there are imporant reasons linked to
security or the protection of a state's essential furt€rests.




res@rch and development), is support-
ing and following action by small and
medium-sized business groupings such
as the Richelieu Committeele.
Competition policy: the aim is to take
proper account of the specificities of
the defence industry when assessing
competition. This effectively mears
carrying out a political analysis as well
as an economic one. [n exchange, states
would undertake to interpret Article
296 of the TEU (formerly /.rlcle 223)
as sparingly as possible, applying it
only to ttre most sensitive goods. Some
parts ofthe Commission are opposed to
this somewhat differential approach.
fui opportunity for a change of view
will present itself in 2000 when the
legislation covering mergers is re-
viewed. States are an),way tending to-
wards the more sparing interpretation
ofArticle 296, because ofbudget con-
straints and the need for cooperation.
Even France, traditionally a supporter
of a wider interpretation of Article 296,
seems to be tempering its policy in this
regard2o.
Exports: since 1994, dual-use goods
have fallen within the Commission's
commercial sphere of responsibility
(Article I33 of the TEU). Joint meas-
ures were take,n pursuant to Article
1321 of the TEU. A list of dual-use
F" ni.naieo Cornmifiee is a French national asso-
ciaion of small and medilun-sized advanced technolory
businesses, founded in 1989. In 1996 the Richelieu
Commiuee set up the European Federation of Advanced
Technolory Businesses. Its aims are to repesent the
imeress of high-tech SMBs vis-d-vis governmerfs and
assist members in their relafiions with large companies,
particularly within Europe.
'o At the 43rd,Le Bourget Air Show, on 19 June 1999,
French Prime Minister Lionel Joqpin stated that it
would be desirable for France and its parmers to give
thought to dwdoping the provisions of the Treaty of
Rome. In particular Anide 223, tf rctained as at pre-
sent, could slow downthe enrcrgence of a real European
armamems industry. It was therefore necessary he
meintaine4 to view the dismantling of barriers to the
amanents ma*et with eqanimity.
2l TEU: Title V: Provisions on a CommonForeign and
Security Poliqr Article 13.3 seoond paragraph: '"The
gmds is published every year. COARM
is continuing its work, following the
adoption of the Code of Conduct on
defence exports in 1998 (see paragraph
41). COARM has virtually reached the
scage of finalising a list of relevant
goods. A greal deal of work has gone
into this area.
Structural funds: the KONVER pro-
gramme" is no longer in existence.
Regional reconversion measures are
continuing and are now included within
the wider geireral structual funds pro-
gramme'.
Principles of market access: this ques-
tion might be tackled within the frame-
work of commercial tansatlantic dia-
logue if EU and United States indus-
uialists so wish. For the time being the
matter has not been raised directly. It is
possible that the Commission may ini-
tially exclude the American markets
within the system but plan for a mutual
opening of markets by both Europe and
the United States in the longer term.
Performance measurement: as this ex-
ercise was received with some reserya-
tion on the part of European indusfry,
work is being directed towards com-
parison ofthe practices and procedures
that apply in the United States with re-
gard to exports, zubsidies, public pro-
cursmsnt, tenders etc. Work in this
area is in progress.
Enlargement: a study of the defence in-
dusries of certain cental European
countries has just been carried out at
tlre request of the Commission's DG III
and was published last June.
Council shall recommefld common srategies to the
European Council and implemenr them" in particular b5r
adopting joint actions and common positions".
22 KO].I\R Community progamme for the conver-
sion to altemative uses of deferrce indusries in regiors
that are heavily aeeenaeff on defence activities. The
pogxamme mn from 1 994-97.
23 The ide4 in the long ruq of using the stnrtual
f,mfu for some kind of overall indusfiial juste retour
rathertlnn one confined to tle narower defence indus-




49. The Commission cannot make progress in
its work on all these points while there are no
clear policy instructions from the Council. Under
the cover of an arrangement that would satisfy
member states there could be a move towards a
tans-pillar system such as has been achieved
already for dual-use goods (see paragraph 43).
This solution is a possible one, although more
complicated to implement. It would allow for
progress towards the application of common pro-
cedures, on a case-by-case basis at first.
50. The last word here goes to Chris Patten,
Commissioner for Extemal Relations. In his
wriuen replies to MEPs in September 1999, he
stressed that once WEU had completed the audit
ofoperational assets available for European op-
erations, the European Commission would be
able to contribute, as it should to the sfengthen-
rng of industrial and technological support. He
added furtherthat:
"we could look at ways of creating a
single arm:unent policy in the EU. This
could require Community action on open-
irg op defence procurement, competition
rules, research programmes, import duties
and export controls"24.
Letter of Intent (LoI)
51. The Letter of Intent conceming measures
to facilitate the restmcturing of the European
defence industry signed on 6 July 1998 by the
defence ministers of the same five governments
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom), plus Swede4 sought to encourage the
creation and efficient working of transnational
defence companies in the defence field. 90% of
defence industry reorganisations carried out in
Europe over the last ten years took place in those
six countries. Improving the way transnational
companies operate in the defence sector is there-
fore an issue that primarily affects them. The LoI
set out the aims and principles laid down by gov-
ernments in several domains: security of supply,
export procedures, security of information, Re-
search and Technology (R&T), processing of
technical information and harmonisation of op-
erational needs. This document was the start of
an anrbitious process. Six groups of experts were
set up to define conrmon rules to facilitate the
creation of transnational companies. On 9 July
fr Atlonfn N".r,No. 3134, I Septernber 1999.
1998 the industry ministers of the six countries
concerned asked the industry to put fonvard pro-
posals by the end of October on matters still to
be resolved, including structure of capital and
shareholders' rights. They approved a joint dec-
laration emphasising that it was primarily the
industry's responsibility to set up the necessary
strucrure for a future European integrated aero-
space company and declared that they were ready
to take the appropriate measures to facilitate re-
structuring. The ministers also asked the industry
to set up the Airbus Single Corporate Entity in
1999.
52. The industry had ttree main areas of con-
cern: export procedures, security of information
and the treatnent of technical information. Three
further areas were primarily of interest to gov-
ernments: security of supply, pooling of R&T
fundrng and harmonisation of military require-
merils. Representatives of the European defence
industry are involved in the activities of the LoI
Working Groups. With regard to security of
supply , the parties undertook to accept mutual
interdependence and the possibilrty of abandon-
ing industial capacity. To that end, they under-
took to examine means of achieving security of
supply on the same conditions for each of the
participants. In terms of security of information,
the parties had to decide on minimum measures
to protect classified infonnation. They examined
possibilities of harmonisation and relaxation of
regulations to facilitaf€ information exdrange with-
in the Transnational Defence Company (TDC).
With regard to export procedures, the signatory
countries of the LoI have agreed to apply their
current national laws and regulations on defence
exports to third parties, in a spirit of cooperation
and greater efficiency. Their aim is to develop
common rules and simplify exchanges between
them. They hope to reduce and gradually phase
out contol procedures for fansfers betwesn
them. In order to make effective use of the am-
ount of resources devoted to defence-related R&T,
the parties stated their intention of drawing on
the work of existing fora in order to harmonise
their R&T programmes: In practice this means:
maximising the use of dual-use tech-
nologies;
seeking opportunities for cooperation;
ensuring efficient R&T cost-sharing
between the parties; and
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access to results under fair and reason-
able terms.
With regard to the processing of technical in-
formation, the parties will seek to promote har-
monisation of laws, regulations and procedures
for confi'olling disclosure and the use of technical
information. With regard to harmonisation of
military requireme,nts, the governments have car-
ried out an analysis of their military capabilities
geared to the qpectrum of tasks in which their
armed forces are involved. Areas in which har-
monisation is considered possible can also be
ide,ntified from the capacities identified as being
of common interest. The parties furthermore plan
to identiry at an early stage projects considered to
be suitable for cooperative researc\ dwelopme,nt
and procurement.
53. The Letler of Intent provides for an Ex-
ecutive Commiuee as its only permanexrt stnrc-
ture, to be made up of one high-level representa-
tive per country who will act as ttrat counfiy's
focal point. The Executive Committee coordi-
nates the drafting of arrange,me,nts and binding
agreemeirts pur$umt to the LoI. It sets up work-
ing groups as required to carry out the tasks
arisrng from the LoI, defines their remir and
coordinates, supervises and evaluates the work of
each of those groups. The lauer may include in-
dustry rq)resexfiatives. The Executive Commiuee
and the working groups are expected to take due
account of similar work being carried out in
other fora in order to reduce the likelihood of
different assessments of ide,ntical probluns and
construct, where possible, a cohereirt common
position. This applies in particular to similar
work being done by the industry ministers
(Anicle 2.4 ofthe LoI).
54. The Letter of Intent also provides a time-
table. Arrangernents and binding agreements pur-
suant to the Lo[ are to be negotiated between
July 1998 and June 1999, and finafised and sign-
ed between July and December 1999, before be-
ing incorporated, as appropriate, in national leg-
islation and regulations.
55. The LoI counties are showing a will to
succeed. Industry has been consulted throughout
the working groups' activities. The outcome
could be an overall cross-county agreement
bringing together all of those activities by the end
of 1999. The results of the working groups are
based on tlre lowest cofirmon dsnominator of
consensus. However, progress is still possible,
including during negotiation of the umbrellia
agreeme,ff. For the few items still outstanding, a
Steering Committee at NADs level could be con-
ve,ned. There i5 a lingering uncertainty over the
legal procedure to be followed. Will an MoU be
sufficient or will the choice be a reaty with le-
gally binding force? Several groups of experts
have identified principles and measures whose
application would require monitoring. The matter
of whether the LoI should be supported by per-
nune,nt stnrctures is therefore likely to arise.
Could the outcome of the LoI negotiations simply
be tansferred to ottrer frameworks @U or
WEAGNIEAO) or would use be made of the ex-
isting Steering Committee? According to some
LoI signatories, as the negotiations were carried
out so quickly, not all problems were dealt with
and those that were, were not always handled
satisfactorily. However all the LoI signatories are
agreed that the negotiations were both a step
forward and the start of a long-haul process that
should continue (see paragraph 48).
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation(occAR)
56. The four OCCAR member countries
(France, Germany, Italy and the United King-
dorn, see paragraphs 4, 6 and l0) have drawn up
the following aims and principles of coopera-
tions:
- 
progft[nmes: obtain greater cost effi-
cie,ncy tbrough new prograrrme nuxl-
ageinent methods, more efficient proce-
dwes for letting confracts and inte-
grated industial project managerne,ff;
- 
preparation for ttre fuUrre: coordination
of long-term needs under a joint policy
for investrneirt in technology;
- 
procureme,rf: improvemeirt of the Euro-
pean defence industrial and technolo-
gical base, bringing companies closer
together, developing identical rules for
competitive tendering;
industrial cooperation: abandoning an
anafytical calculation of industrial /sle
retour on a progftrmme-by-programme
ET-or furtter infonnation on the founding of OCCAR
and its guiding principles see Assaribly Document
1623, (Nwember 1998) paragraphs 3l-37.
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basis and replacrng it with the pursuit
of an overall multi-programme/multi-
year balance;
involvement of other partrrcrs: possible
association of other European countries
if all partrrers are agreed.
Furthennore, each participant undertakes to give
preference to the equipment to whose develop-
me,nt they have contibuted in the OCCAR
framework.
57. The majority of programmes cu:renfly
managed by OCCAR are between France and
Germaay (Tiger combat helicopter, Milan and
Hot anti-unk missiles, Roland missiles, etc.),
some are between France and ltaly (such as the
FSAF 
- 
future anti-aircraft systems family), oth-
ers are ffilateral. The Cobra anti-radar battery
(FrancdGermanyAJnited Kingdom) was OCCAR's
first non-exclusively Franco-German integrated
programme. There are plans to integrate the
third-generation anti-tank missile AC3G-MP
(France, Germany and the LJK with Belgium and
the Netherlands), the third-generation AC3G-LP
anti-tank missile (Germany) 
- 
possibly soon to
be amalgamated into the Tiger programme 
- 
and
the PAAMS air-defence syste,m (France, Italy
and the UK). The AC3G-MP is interesting
because for the fust time non-OCCAR countries
are involved. The signing of trvo memoranda of
understanding is envisaged" one on the integra-
tion of the programme into OCCAR (France,
Gerrrany and the UK) and the other to secure the
tie-up with Belgium and the Netherlands, both of
which would rmdertake to comply with OCCAR's
rules. There are also plans for the eventual inte-
gration of the Polyphun missile (France, Ger-
many and Italy) and the Horizon airdefe,nce
frigate (France and Germany minus the UK).
Several new progftlrnmes could be developed
within the OCCAR frameworlg such as the
GTMRAV (multi-role armoured vehicle) (Ger-
many and the UK minus France but possibly plus
the Netherlands). With regard to the Futnre Trans-
port Aircraft (FTA) progftrnme (France, Ger-
nuny, ttaly and the UK with BelgiunL Portugal,
Spain and Turkey), the Board of Supervisors has
considered whether it would be appropriate for
OCCAR to become the confiacting agency for
FTA production. No decision has yet beentaken.
58. The decision that was taken immediately
to integrate some existing progftlmmes serves to
demonstrate a political resolve on tIrc part of the
contracting nations quickly to consolidate efforts
already under way and their confidence in the
present stmctures as they stand. The program-
mes were integrated before OCCAR's man-
agement procedures were finally approved. Pri-
ority was given to setting up an initial set of fi-
nancial, contractual and intemal rules that were
consiste,nt and management procedures that
would be of practical help to those in charge of
the integrated programmes in implementing new
methods of managune,nt. The implerrentation of
this corpus of OCCAR rules and procedures as
well to prograrnmes that predated the organisa-
tion but are now integrated into iq should pro-
duce marked results in terms of cost savings and
shorter deadlines. The second priority wuts to
assemble ttrc necessary resources to provide
OCCAR with the legal personality it required to
allow it to conaad and manage staff independ-
ently. On 9 Septernber 1998, the four govenx-
me,ffs involved signed a Conve,ntion on the Es-
tablishment of the Organisation for Joint Arma-
ment Cooperation. The ratification process is still
continuing and should conclude early in 2000.
Only from the new programmes managed from
within the organisation can hard evidence be ob-
tained of whether OCCAR is operating well and
of the added value it can bring. As one comme,rr-
tator has observed: "only in the tuly new pro-
gmmmes suited to innovative managemelrt tech-
niques and where industrial burden-sharing has
not been set in stone from the outset, can new
ideas be applied; ultimately only they can dem-
onstrate the added value obtained from ttre or-
ganisation"26. Issues such as how to accormt for
industrial rstum on work subconfiacted to non-
OCCAR countries have now been resolved.
Rules governing security and the managemeift of
se,nsitive information exist although have yet to
be implemented in practice. However, a resolu-
tion has been found to the important issue of a
set of procurement procedures, which is the es-
sential basis for the award of contacts.
59. fuiother important issue is OCCAR's pos-
sible enlargement (see paragraph 10). It is stated
in the prearnble to the Convention that the
OCCAR counties wish to associate ottrer Euro-
E 
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pean states which accept all the provisions of the
Convention. They must also take part in a pro-
gramme managed by OCCAR. France in particu-
lar has argued for a deepe,ning of OCCAR before
any enlargement takes place. The Netherlands
officially applied to join in April 1999 with a
view to taking part in the GTK/MRAV or
AC3G-MP progrcrnmes. While the four OCCAR
states agree to its joining, there is still some un-
certainty over the progftrrrlme in which it is to be
involved. Belgium made a formal application in
March 1998, with a proposal for taking part in
Helios, GTKA,IRAV or AC3G-MP, and in Janu-
ary 1999 the Swedish authorities formally ex-
pressed interest in joining OCCAR.
60. According to Jean-Yves Hehefl, Head of
the Direction Gen6rale de l'Armemexf (the
French Governrne,nt Procuremeffi Office) "OCCAR
is now an important European body in the
arrraments field. The amounts earmarked by all
the counties involved for spending on the seven
prograilrmes it manages (Hoq Milan, Rolan4
Brevel Tiger, Cobra and FSAF) are in excess of
€17.5 billion and the planned irftegration, shortly
to go ahea{ of three additional programnes
(AC3GA4P, AC3G/LP and VBCI 
- 
cunsntly
GTMRAV without France's particrpation)
will bring the total up to e26.5 billion".
Furthermore, Geireral Alberto Zignaill, the Italian
National Armaments Director and Chairman of
OCCA& addressing the Assembly's Defence
and Technological and Aerospace Committees in
Rome on 14 October 1998, made the point ttrat
't]re results obtained to date within the frame-
work of the two initiatives (OCCAR and
WEAG) are not opposrng initiatives but move
towards the same goal: a one and only arma-
ments Europe". It should be noted that the EAA
timetable as sst out in the Masterplan provides
for a compatibility between the EAA and
OCCAR (see paragraph 128).
NATO
61. Armaments cooperation between NATO
counties is the responsibility of the Conference
of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) which
meets in plenary session twice a year, chaired by
the Secretary4eneral. The Pennanent Chairman
fr 
"to OCI: wolutions et perqp€ctives', Jean-Yves
Helrner, Dbfense Nationale, No. 10, October 1999,
pages5547.
is the Assistant Secretary-Gsneral for Defence
Support. It brings together senior sffisials re-
sponsible for defence procurexnent (for NATO
countries the same National Armaments Direc-
tors (NADs) as sit in WEAG), rspresentatives of
the Military Commiuee and the NATO Hieh
Comrnands in order to review, on a regular basis,
the political, economic and technical aspects of
equipment development and procureme,lrt for
NATO forces. A Research and Technology Com-
mittee, which is an integrated NATO body res-
ponsible for defeirce-related technology research
and development, provides advice and assistance
to the Confere,nce of National Armaments Direc-
tors and the Military Commiuee. The aim of
NATO's armament structures is to ensure inter-
operability of equipment and to facilitate satis-
faction of the minimum requireme,lrts for com-
mon systerns to carry out whe,lr member coun-
tries so wish, NATO C3I (command, control
communication and intelligence) functions, which
are essential for transatlantic cooperation and
coordination of national procurexnexft. Repre-
se,ntatives of the National ArfiIaments Direclors
(NADREPs) within the national delegations of
member counries undertake ttre routine tasks of
the CNAD and direct the work of its groups. The
NATO armaments groups for air (NAFAG), land
(NAAG) and sea (NNAG) forcesa support the
work of the Confere,nce to which they are ans-
werable. Some 250 groups, subgroups and work-
ing groups :uswer to the three Main Arma:nents
Working Groups (NAAG, NAFAG and NNAG,
and the NATO Group on Acquisitions Practice
(AC/313). This last group is WEAG Panel III's
opposite number. The NATO lndustrial Advisory
Group (NIAG) is fully integrated into ttre system
unlike the relationship of EDIG to WEAG. There
are also ad hoc Special Project Groups (such as
ttre Alliance Ground Surveillance Steering Com-
miuee) and Parrrership Groups for codification,
quality 
€rssurzmce, safety aspects of tansport,
storage of military ammunition and explosives,
standardisation of materiel and the engineering
practices, safety and suitability for service of
munitions and explosives. Finally, there is the
NATO Conventional Armaments Review Com-
miuee (NCARC), originally responsible for the
Conve,mional Anmamerffs Planning Systerr (CAP S )
-y4p46' 
NATo Airforce Armament' Group;
NAAG: NATO Army Armaments Group; NNAG:






and now in charge of the new AIMS (Armament
L:formation Managerruf Systern) database, which
is also usedbyWEAG Panel I.
62. The NATO Research and Technology Or-
ganisation (RTO) is responsible for integrating
the direction and coordination of NATO defence
research and technology, conducting and promot-
ing cooperative research and technical informa-
tion exchange, and developing a long-term
NATO Research and Technology strategy to
maintain a leading edge in meeting Alliance mili-
tary needs. It is supported by an extensive net-
work of national experts. The RTO is answerable
both to the Military Committee and to the
Conference of National Armaments Directors. It
comprises a Research and Technology Board
(RTB) and a Research and Technology Agency
(RTA) wittr its headquarters at Neuilly-sur-Seine
(France). The range of R&T activities is covered
by six panels made up of national representa-
tives. The panels maintain links with military
users and other NATO bodies. The scielrtific and
technical work of the RTO is carried out by
Technical Teams created for a specific duration.
The teams organise workshops, symposi4 field
tials, lecture series and training courses.
63. Since 1993 the CNAD has been directing
its work towards key sectors such as ha::nonisa-
tion of military on an Alliance-wide
basis, promotion of essential battlefield interop-
erability, the pursuit of identified cooperative
opportunities, the promotion of improved transat-
lantic cooperation and the developmelrt of critical
defence technologies.Ia,1994 the CNAD agreed
a series of practical cooperation measures with
WEAG.
64. NATO has a Logistics, Armaments and
Resources Division, which was established in
1995 as apart ofthe International Military Staff.
This is responsible for the development and as-
sessmerrt of NATO military policy and proce-
dures in the area of manpower, resources, mili-
tary budgets, infrastructure, arrnaments plarning,
cooperation and standardisation. Within the In-
ternational Secretariat the Division of Defence
Support has responsibility for all matters retating
to research, developme,lrt, production and pro-
curemerm of armaments, and for extended air de-
fence.
65. The NATO Armaments Review (NAR)
continues and has e,lrtered its third phase. After
consideration of NATO's role in ar5naments from
Novernber 1996 to December 1997, a review of
assets necessa.ry to allow NATO carry out ttrat
role was conducted between etd-I997 and May
1999. Implementing measures are to be defined
by December 1999. The Review's priorities are
the harmonisation of operational needs, the pro-
motion of interoperabilrty on a wide scale and, in
the field of procurerne,lr! coordinated acquisition
of small arms, life-cycle support armaments and
R&T. After three years' worlg the inteirtion is
not to bring about a radical change but rather to
set up over the longer term a coordination pro-
cess which will uttimately produce benefits.
66. NATO provides the principal frame of
refere,nce for defirung interoperability conditions
and standardisation agreeme,lrts. It also procures
joint NATO equipmelrg coordinates maintenance
and support, and has responsibility for the op-
eration of the major joint systeins, such as the
Air Comrnand and Control Sysem (ACCS)
battlefield surveillance systexn and exteirded air
defence. With regard to standaxdisation and in-
teroperability of forces and equipmerq NATO
makes a vital contnbution. Sundardisation agr@-
ments for procedures and systems (STANAGS)
are developed and promulgated by NATO's
Military Agency for Standardisation, in conjunc-
tion with the CNAD. NATO efforts are directed
not only towards operational standardisation but
also towards harmonising prograrnmes that fac-
ilitate industrial cooperation betwe€n its mem-
bers. Could NATO take on a greatsr role in
transatlantic industrial cooperation? As far as
Europeans are concerned, NATO's role in the
armarnents fietd has its limits. Europeans are not
inclined to €lltust to NATO joint armnments
planning, or definition and control of a tansat-
lantic indusfial policy. This is made impossible
by the very great imbalances betwee,n American
and European industries and production runs,
together with the absence of any real reciprocity
with regard to market access and the export re-
strictions imposed on cooperative ve,ntures by the
United States. The probability is therefore that
tansatlantic cooperation will continue to develop
tnad hoc fashion2e.
F 
"P*qp".dr* de dweloppement de I'industrie
europeene de defense: vers rurc politique cornmune de
I'armsment" by Sandxa Mezzadr:.. under the super-
vision of Professor Mahnckq Mdmoire de Dipl6me des
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(b) Nsk of competition and possibilities for
cooperation
67. Cooperation is possible in certain areas
that are comple,mentary, while in others there is a
risk of competition or duplication. This is there-
fore an il'sa salling for discussion of a clear di-
vision oftasks, taking account of the prospect for
developing individual cooperation sEuctures.
Without identifying all risks of competition or
exhausting all potential areas for cooperation
between the various exising frameworks, this
section ofthe report focuses on existing coopera-
tion arrangements betweerx WEAG and the EU.
Some possible opportunities for inter-instiur-
tional exchange are also orplored and attention is
given to two priority areas: harmonisation of
military requirements and R&T. As both are up-
stream of armame,nts cooperatiorq they are cur-
rently also the subject of a welter of initiatives,
thus increasiog the risk of duplication and inco-
herence. Urgent and serious consideration mus
be given to the case for further and systeinatic
rationalisation in these two areas.
68. On 16 Nove,mber 1998, in Rome, WEAG
defe,nce ministers rea^ffirmed WEAG's status as
the sole European armamexfis cooperation forum.
The fact they felt the need to do so clearly proves
that there are doubts about its singular status.
They recognised the need for a more coherent
approach with regard to the various amnmerxts-
related initiatives taken in Europe at the indus-
trial governmental and institutional levels. But
before one can even begin to conternplate what
institutional :urangeme,lils might be appropriate,
a basic examination is necessary of ways in
which the numerous exising cooperation stnrc-
nues interact with one another.
(i) Existing contacts between WEAG and the
EU
69. The Declaration adopted by WEU on 22
July 1997 and annexed to the Fina1 Act of ttre
lntergovemmental Conference sulminating in the
signing of the Amsterdam Treaty on 2 October
1997, includes the following in the range of
measures for emhanced cooperation tbat might be
taken forward between the EU and WEU:
"cooperation in the field of arm;ments, as ap-
propriate, within ttre framework of the Western
dudes 6uropdenes approfondies @iploma tlrcsis) 1997-
98, College ofEurope, Bn4es, pages 37-38.
European Armimerils Group (WEAG) as the
European forum for armame,nts cooperation, the
EU and WEU in the context of rationalisation of
the European armame,nts market and the estab-
lishment of a European Armamerfs Agency''.
70. In November 1997, European Commission
activities accelerated WEAG moves towards
closer cooperation v/ith this institution. Its paper
on "Implementing European Union strategy on
defence-related industies", with its appended
action plan, (COM (97) 583 final), made pos-
sible arrangeme,ffs for mutual information and
cooperation on common aims. Many of the areas
of concern me,ntioned in the Commission paper
corresponded to problems which Panel III had
been working on since 1990. To avoid duplica-
tion of effort or, worse still, divergence in activi-
ties, cooperation :rrrangemexrts were set up be-
twee,n dre European Commission and WEAG
Panel Itr.
71. On 10 May 1999, the Council of the
European Union approved the document entitled
"Arrangflnexfs for enhanced cooperation be-
twee,n the European Union and the Westem Eur-
opean Union under the Protocol on Article 17 of
the Treaty on European Union". Section F, "Co-
operation in the field of aunamef,lts, as appro-
priate", provides for more regular exchanges of
informal information, without alteration of their
infonnal character. The WEAG presidency, the
EU presidency (presidency of the Ad Hoc Eur-
opean Armaments Policy Group 
- 
POLARM and
the European Commission are identified as con-
tact points and the main channels of commun-
ication. They are seexr as drawmg support from
the contacts between the General Secretariat of
ttre EU Council and the WEAG "Armarllexrts"
Secretariat. With regard to ongoing work on
areas of common interest, it is expected that there
will be regular reporting by the two preside,ncies
and the Commission. Regular information ex-
changes :!re now taking place in relation to
POLARM Group and WEAG activities. They
are based on exchanges of working documents
and on meetings between the EU and European
Commission presidencies (in accordance with
their respective rernits) and the WEAG presid-
ency. It is possible for informal sessions to take
place betweeir the POLARM Group and WEAG
on matters relating to their work. The .urange-
ment also leaves open the possibility that con-
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siderations related to affuunents may be ad-
dressed by the EU and WEU during defence-
related work. ln Appendix ry to "Arrargements
for enhanced cooperation between the European
Union and the Western European Union", para-
gaph 4 ("Attendance at meetings") mentions the
possibility of WEU representatives being invited
by the Commission to confibute to discussions
at meetings of the Commission's inter-service
Armaments Policy G.o,rp.
72. Following the Cologne Summit, WEAG's
relations with the European Union are set to
change over the coming years if only because the
EU will become WEAG's partner in dialogue for
issues formerly dealt with in the WEU-WEAG
framework. These may take on a new dimension
if innovative ideas such as the notion of Euro-
pean defence capability criteria are pursued and
more intensive work is done on those aspects of
the matter in which the EU has already taken an
interest. The discussion papers on the future of
WEAG (see paragraphs 134-137) raise the pos-
sibility of a new political framework for its rela-
tions with the EU, which might well give rise to
some creative thinking. Is there a way of making
use of WEAG's energy and expertise to attain
the wider objectives of the new European defence
initiative, of encouraging the EU to make better
use of what WEAG can do to help it achiwe its
new ambitions (particularly as regards defence
capabilities) and of !filrling bridges between
WEAG and the new authorities and structures
which will henceforth be taking care of security
and defence matters in the EU framework? Can
all this be done while at the same time retaining
WEAG's institutional set-up and its specific
acquis, protecting its members' rights and leav-
ing it free to make other changes and improve-
merils necessary to streamline and consolidate its
activities?
(ii) Possibilities for cooperation between
WEAG and the LoI Group
73. There is also a need to consider possibili-
ties for informal cooperation between the LoI
Group and WEAG. The WEAG presidency has
made contact with the LoI authorities, but with-
out so far receiving a reply. Article 2.4 ofthe LoI
states clearly that the Executive Committee and
its Working Groups will have due regard to
similar work being carried out in other fora and
should establislL where possible, a consistelrt and
corrmon position with them. In its reply to Re-
commendation 634, the Council states that
'IMEU as such does not pLay a direct role in the
search for solutions to privatisation and ration-
alisation-related issues. However several sub-
groups of WEAG are addressing problems re-
lated to the rationalisation of the European de-
fence industry". A reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation on the general thrust of the work being
carried out in the various working groups of the
two bodies would app@r to be desirable, in the
first place between the LoI Executive Commiuee
and the WEAG Steering Committee, and likewise
more specialist working relations between the
LoI Working Groups and the WEAG Panels.
(iii) Possibilities for cooperation berween the
LoI Group and the EU
74. In tenns of coordinating work carried out
in both the LoI Group and the EU, it should be
easy by definition to establish a bridge between
the LoI Group and POLARM experts since the
six LoI signatory states are menrbers of POLARM
which meets "at 15" within the EU. It does ap-
pear that participant countries want to achieve
concrste results through the existing structure be-
fore considering any kind of enlargement. How-
ever there is a view amongst LoI signatory states
that the results obtained on this more limited
basis could constitute a firm basis for harmon-
isation that could be exended to other counties.
75. With regards to exports, the LoI Working
Group on elport procedures has been working
with reference to the Code of Conduct adopted
within the EU in June 1998 (see paragraph 41).
One possibilrty might be to convey the agree-
ments ratified by the six LoI counfies to
COARM to ascertain whether they are accept-
able to the other nine EU member states.
76. A first atternpt at consultation betwee,n the
various existing cooperation frameworks (LoI,
the EU Council Secretariat and the European
Commission, along with OCCAR and WEAG
and EDIG) has been made at the initiative of the
Commission's DG III. A first informal meeting
was held in February 1999. Another is scheduled
for the autwnn. All fora concemed are agreed on
the usefulness of such meetings which in this
particular configuration are unprecede,lrted.
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(iv) H a rmoni s ati o n of op e r ati o nal r e qui r e m ent s
77. A key question for the future of arma-
merlts cooperation in defence Europe rsmains
harmonisation of requirements. Harmonisation of
military requireme,nts can lead to oppornrnities
for cooperative research and production and
thence to joint military procurement. The devel-
opme,nt in the European Union of the defence
capabilities necessary for effective functioning
implies the formation of a Defence Industial and
Technological Base. This will corre about through
the definition of the minimum requirements to be
met in order to provide a basis for Europe's
security and autonomy in defence. Such an ap-
proach implies the evaluation of what European
counties already have, what they need to pro-
duce cooperatively and what they must procure
outside Europe. The audit in progress in WEU
and NATO's resea^rch on defence capabilities
will no doubt make clear where the deficiencies
lie and quick decisions will need to be taken to
launch progranrmes to make good those defic-
iencies. Hence it is necessary to take account of
the results of the audit of available assets and
capabilities carried out in WEU and work being
done on harmonisation of military requirements
within WEAG, ELT and in other European arma-
ments cooperation sfudures, including the LoI
Group.
78. In Novernber 1997 in Erfurt, WEAG de-
fence ministers agreed that clear and timely indi-
cations on common requirements should be given
to industry. Such an initiative would also encour-
age European defence industries to form associa-
tions with each other to respond to large orders
and would promote more effective use of re-
sources for the development of new technologies.
There has been no follow-up to those resolutions
and the greatest obstacle to progress is still the
whole area of harmonisation of joint require-
ments. There are several reasons for this. ln the
abse,nce of a common defence policy, this qpe of
harmonisation is limited by the fact that the ar-
ticulation of military requirements is still a na-
tional responsibility. For each nation, harmoni-
sation implies complex cooperation between mili-
tary users and technical advisers and is difficult
enough at national level. It becomes even more
complicated when 13 or 15 countries are in-
volved.
79. Within WEAG, Panel I has a remit to
provide a pelmanent link between WEAG and
Eurolongterm. ELT has the general aim of pro-
moting effective long-term military planning by
establishing a sound conceptual basis for coop-
eration between WEU nations, with a view to
determining military capabilities and equipment
requirements beyond a ten-year time-frame.
However it is WEAG Panel I that is responsible
for the ERS (Equipment Replacement Schedule)
designed to review nations' future prograrnmes
and e>qplore the potential for further cooperation.
It also supervises the work of programme groups
set up specifically to try to realise the potential
identified in tlre course of the ERS. The aims of
the two groups are therefore entirely complemen-
tary. Eurolongterm identifies the operational as-
pect of joint needs while Panel I's task is to
tanslate ttrose joint needs into equipment pro-
grammes. Relations between WEAG and ELT
are being strengthsned with a document on "Prin-
ciples and procedures for the definitiorq develop-
me,nt and acquisition of operational weapons
systems for the WEAG nations" currently in pre-
paration (see paragraph 23).
80. There has bee,n a proliferation of discus-
sions on harmonisation of needs, often coordi-
nated in practice, as the same experts are in-
volved in the various fora concerned. There is a
case for arguing that coordination should also
involve WEAO and extend to other for4 to take
account in particular of the work on the harmoni-
sation of operational needs now being finalised
within the LoI Group, and of NATO activities
concerning harmonisation ofthe military needs of
the Alliance. These are conducted via the NADs
who attend both the CNAD and WEAG mest-
ings. Preparation for the future is one of the
principles that govern OCCAR. This means es-
tablishing long-term coordination and a common
policy on investncent in technology. There is
therefore a need for coordination of all fora in-
volved in harmonising mrlitary requirements.
81. New factors come into play in identifying
which needs should be harmonise( particularly
the overriding need for interoperability, definition
of essential capabilities, autonomous intelligence,
force projection and C3 (command, conrol and
communication) capabilities. This is a fundamen-
tal problem. No forum working on harmonisation
of military requirements has to date even come
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near &awing up an outline plaxning systern. Har-
monisation of military requirements is essential
for future armaments cooperation. It is a difficult
area in that it is highly political. If achievements
in this area are disappointing, it is because there
is constant friction betwesn ttre requisite political
and sysrriding national interests. It may well be
that there will be no improvunent in this area
until countries have even less to spend on defence
than they do at present and thus have no choice
but to cooperate.
(v) Research and Technologt
82. The new EIJROPA Memorandum of Un-
derstanding referred to in par4graph 34 is a most
timely and higNy important initiative towards
rationalisation, which the WEAG and WEAO
authorities justify in terms of increasing compe-
tition in R&T from other fora such as OCCAR
and the LoI Group. It will allow WEAG coun-
tries more flexibility in awarding research con-
tracts and ensure greater mutual accessibility to
information about each other's future R&T pro-
jects.
83. Complementarity has been identified be-
twee,n the work of the LoI R&T Working Group
and that of WEAO. There is therefore an ugent
requirement to take steps to initiate cooperation
between the trruo. The Lol Group report which is
in the process of being finalised takes into ac-
count work carried out in other fora, parricularly
WEAG Panel IL A set of principles and a plan of
work have been laid down.
Principles defined bythe LoI Group include:
definition of required technologies, pos-
sibility of limited projects, preference
for a model based on competition, re-
jection of juste retour on an individual
project basis, possible use of WEAO as
a contracting agency, a conrmon ap-
proach to other fora involved with
R&T, common principles to be applied
with regard to non-Lol countries, fin-
ancial burden-sharing between industry
and government;
- 
the LoI Group's work also covered the
ability to set up demonstrator pro-
grarnmes, identification of transnational
defence companies, creation of a data-
base of projects being carried out by
signatories, discussion of methods of
funding and management of juste re-
tour onthe basis of overall activity.
Discussions are soon to start between WEAG
and WEAO with a view to practical cooperation.
Ifthese fail, ttrere is a dangerthat a separate new
organisation will be set up. The view taken in
this report is that WEAG should now start pre-
paring for ttrese discussions in a constnrctive
frame of mind. Success in adopting a joint ap-
proach to the shared technologies necessary in
future is an upsteam activity, as essential and
vital as that of harmonising operational require-
ments. The more issues of common interest are
dealt wittr upstrearL the more likely subsequent
equipment cooperation is to succeed.
84. In its reply to Recommendation 634, ttre
Council recalled that "coordination between
WEAG and the European Commission has com-
menced in an informal nuurner. Various technol-
ogy are:N have besn discussed, such as materials,
satellites, navigation and demining. This ex-
change of information aims to avoid duplication
and achieve slnergy to the greatest possible ex-
tent. In addition WEAG regularly organises re-
search and technology-related symposia, the last
one being held in Athens in December 1998, to
which European Union representatives were in-
vited".
85. With regard to Technology Research and
Development (TRD), the Commission runs pro-
grarnmes in which a third of the budget is de-
voted to dual-use technology programmes. Com-
plementarity between research progftlrnmes nun-
aged by WEAG and the Community should be
strengthened to avoid duplication. Informal ex-
ploratory contacts initiated in 1995 and 1996
bstween the Commission's DG XII (science, re-
search and development) and the WEAG auth-
orities have come to nothing. The SCITEC study
report recommends ttrat discussions take place
betrveen the EU, WEAG and the defence industry
to ascertain possible machinery for effective co-
operation between civilian a:rd defence research
prograrnmes at the European levei. SCITEC also
recommends sening a timetable for such dis-
cussions.
86. NATO has a Research and Technology
Committee (ACl323) which is answerable to
both the Military Commiuee and the CNAD. The
committees that work to it deal with such areas
as the technology of information systems sensors
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and electronic devices or applied vehicles tech-
nology. Some se,nior European armame,lrts offi-
cials regard WEAG as NATO's European forum
as far as a::mame,nts cooperation goes, stessing
the usefuIness of having the choice of coopera-
tion either bstween European counfries and the
United States and Canada or simply between
European nations. Complementarity would there-
fore seem to be achiwed de facto by informal
and person to person contact. However, given the
mutual interest in the exchange of information
about research carried out in NATO, WEAO and
WEAG Panel [I, consideration might well be
grven to it being done in a more forrralised and
regular nuurner.
87. Having described the activities of all the
European amraments cooperation for4 evaluated
their work and put forward some suggestions as
to where cooperation might take place, we next
tum to consider possible options for the future,
taking account of progress made in the political
and industrial spheres towards defence Europe.
III. Direaions for the fature:
political and economic cont&, worh in
pt o gr ess, post-C olo gn e s cen arios
1. hogress towods defence Europe in the
p olilic al un il k du strial qth er e s
(a) The Cologne Summit 
- 
antecedents and
follow-up: the process of strengthening the com-
mon European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP)
88. At the Franco4erman Summit held in
Potsdam on I December 1998, the two counfries
concerned stated that they wished to make pro-
gress towards the definition of praoical action
with a view to implerrenting the CFSP, including
a common European defence policy. To that end
they agreed to look into ways to secure for the
EU the operational capability that it lacked by
providing it with its own operational assets
(specifically througfu WEU and European multi-
national forces such as the European Corps) or
NATO asssts pursuantto the agreeme,lrts reached
at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin.
They pledged to encourage joint industrial or
technological projects with a view to the creation
of European groupings, specifically in the de-
fence and aeronautics industries.
89. At the Franco-British Summit in Saint
Malo on 4 Decernber, the French President and
British Prime Minister also agreed in paragraph
4 of their Joint Declaration on European Defe,nce
that "Europe needs strengthened armed forces
ttrat can react rapidly to new risks, and which are
suppofted by a sfiong and competitive European
defence industry andtechnology" .
90. In paragraph 2 of the Cologue Declaration
on strengthening tle common European policy on
security and defence, adopted by the European
Council on 4 June 1999, ttre Fifteen confined
themselves to acknowledging that, as well as de-
veloping more effective European military cap-
abilities there was "a need to undertake sustained
efforts to suengthen the indusfrial and techno-
logcal defence base" which they wanted to be
"competitive and dynamic". They avowed their
determination 'to foster the restnrcturing of the
European defence industries :Lmongst those states
involved" and 'to work towards closer and more
efficie,nt defe,nce industry collaboration" and
"seek further progress in the harmonisation of
military requireme,nts and the planning and pro-
curemert of arms, as member states consider
appropriate". The refere,lrce here both to har-
monisation of military requirements and arms
procuremexrt is encouraging but represe,lrts no
more than a broad declaration of intent. It is left
to the me,mber statcs to take such meilsures as
they see fit. In the German Presidency Report on
strengthemlng the common European policy on
security and defence, the question of armaments
cooperation is ignored completely. In Section 3
on "Decision making" it is observed that "further
institutional questions may need to be addres-
sed". Are the European armamsnts cooperation
age,ncies :Lmong the issues that are still pending?
At Cologne it was ageed ttrat a new re,port on
the corunon security and defence policy would
be submiued to the Helsinki European Council.
Are the EU counries ready to put flesh on the
Cologne initiatives?
91. President Chirac's plan of aoion on Euro-
pean defence, which w:N conveyed to the Finnish
Presidency of the EU at the end of July stresses
thatto make available the European military cap-
abilities required for action implies that an arna-
melrts technological and industrial base must ef-
fectively be set up. This is to be done by way of
definition ofthe minimum requirements that need
to be met to ensure Europe's autonomy in secu-
rity and defence. The plan refers to a military
headquarters and other collective decision-mak-
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ing capabilities zuch as a satellite cerlfie, a mili-
tary secretariag an institute for security studies
and a fledgling arrn:unerfs agency. These com-
ponerfs will have linls and interact with the High
Representative, the Policy planning and Early
Wanmg Unit (PPEWU) and the CFSP compo-
ne,nts of the Council Secretariat. The procedures
for such interaction are to be clarified at alater
date. Under consideration also is ttre intoduction
of convergence criteria that will offer an effective
encouragfirerxt to European nations to move to-
wards a common defence. For example, ttrese
might relate to the share of the national product
allocated to armaments, how funding for research
and developmeirt is use{ equipmsnt procure-
me,nt, projection capability, statr and the degree
to which the armed services have moved towards
becoming fully professional.
92. At the Conference of Anrbassadors in
Paris on 26 Augus 1999, President Chirac put
forward the sarne points on the subject of defence
Europe. France is proposing to its partrers that
specific and realistic objectives be defined which
would constitute real convergence criteria. These
could be developed around five broad areas:
adaptation and wider joint management
of existing intelligence, command and
tansport asssts, for instance, with con-
version of the European Corps into a
European rapid reaction force over the
coming year;
definition of the military capabilities
the European Union should be able to
draw on collectively *trsn deciding on
intervention, force projection and com-
mand;
determination for each of the 15 Euro-
pean Union countries of the level and
nature of the military assets it under-
takes to make available to the Com-
munity if requested to do so;
with regard to forces' preparation,
drafting of joint standards for uaining
and exercises;
harmonisation of the equipment pro-
gramming schedules of the 15 coun-
tries, a necessary condition for the de-
velopment of a European anname,rts
indusUry.
President Chirac has proposed that the EU's
future Political and Security Committee, apart
from monitoring the CFSP and any crises that
may arise, should be asked to make the develop-
ment of such convergeirce criteria a priority so
that practical progress can be made towards
achieving defence Europe, which will be one of
the priorities of France's presidency ofthe Euro-
pean Union inthe second half of next year.
93. At the British-Italian Summit in Rome on
19 and 20 July 1999, Mr d'Alema and Mr Blair
flelded a proposal to set criteria for improved and
strengthened European defsnce capabilities to be
discussed and agreed at the WEU ministerial
meeting in Luxenrbourg and the European Coun-
cil summit in Helsinki an approach that would
be undelpinned by a "road map" for more effec-
tive European defence procurexnexlt, covering
harmonisation of military and col-
laborative arms procurernent. The two countries
also undertook to promote defe,lrce indusfy re-
structuring
94. At the Franco-Italian sumrnit held in lfimes
on 23 and 2a Septerfter 1999, Mr d'Alerra stated
that he was in agreemexfi, broadly speaking, with
President Chirac's plan. However he stressed
that, from Italy's point of view, there were still
some points to be discussed in grcanr depth be-
fore reaching a common position at the Helsinki
Summit on l0 and 11 December. [n view of these
circumstances, France and ltaly did not release a
European defence policy joint statement follow-
rng the Summit'o. During Preside,nt Chirac's of-
ficial visit to Spain on 5 October, Mr Aaar did
not rule out his country taking pafi if necessary
in an enlarged group of"catalyst" countries atrx-
ious to move the European defence project for-
ward, but he made reference to his earlier hope of
the Fifteen moving fonvard togethefl.
95. A very widely held view is that the devel-
opme,nt of a European arm:rmexts policy will be
the driving force for a European solution on
across-the-board rationalisation of the European
armamexrts sector. At the same time "spontan-
eous" industrial restructuring is interacting with
the initiatives taken by governments. This seems
to be the direction taken by the LoI Group which
%i*ti" N*t,No 3142, 29 Septenrber 1999.




favours support to signatory states but leaves
industry a free hand as regards restructuring per
se. The thesis that fa[ing defence budgets could
prove the most powerfirl impehrs towards indus-
trial reorganisation might be advanced. But the
threat ttrat such cuts pose to the policy intr,ntions
discussed earlier must not be understated (see
paragraphs 96 tr). It would be perverse to advo-
cate that Europe should have its own credible de-
fence capability without setting aside the means
to achieve it.
(b) Expenditure on defence and industrial re-
stntcturing: state of play, issues and outlook
(i) European countries'defence budgets and con-
vergence criteria
96. The WEU countries together spend half as
much on procurelnent as the United States and a
third as much on defe,nce research and develop-
mend'. The French Defeirce Minister, Alain
Richard has remarked that "if all our Europeaa
partners together allocated ttre same amounts to
defence innovation as our own two countries
(France and the United Kingdom) we would
make up just half of the US budget in this area.
This rough calculation is enough to give a realis-
tic indication that it is possible gradually to
bridge this particular tecbnology gap, provided
that everyone plays their part and everyone is
willing to work together. It is also necessary that
we make good choices of equipment. That is one
of my 6651 important priorities. I feel that it is
absolutely esse,ntial to reach agreement with our
partrcrs"33.
97. European couutries spsnd US$ 140 billion
a year on defe,nce, compared wittr America's
US$ 290 billion, yst possess about l0% of
America's capacity to deploy and sustain toops
outside the NATO are* . Furthermore, it would
appqr that the gap in military spending between
Americans and Europeans is growing. [n the
United States a large proportion of the defence
budget over the period 2000-2005 will be spent
on modernislng air force equipment with the
'"LEurope de h defense rlans l'{llia1ss atlantique",
Frangois Heisbourg (Presidem of the Gensva Security
Policy Cenre), PolitiEte dtrwtgdre, 2199, page 225.
71 k Monde,l4 July 1999.
3a Paper by Charles Grant on'European Ddence Post-
Kosovo", July 1999, quoted inDefense News,2 August
1999.
procureme,nt of Joint Striker Fighters (JSF), in-
creasing the fleet of B-2 bombers, replacrng the
F-15 aircra.ft by the F-22 afi purchasing 120 C-
17 transport aircraft. In contast, cuts will be
made in European defence programmes and, ac-
cording to ttre lntemational lnstitute for Srategic
Studies (IISS), present budget plans3s make it
unlikely that current commiunents can be hon-
oured.
98. Moreover, as is well knovn:, the aggregate
capacity of all EU me,mbers falls short of true
operational autonomy in such areas as strategic
[ff6, and tn ad hoc coalitions what will be on





of the European military jig-
sa#'. Moreover EU me,lnber states can muster
some 1.9 million troops (500 000 more that the
United States), but only a tiny proportion (some
2%) could really be e,mployed in an operation
planned by Europeans under European com-
mand. In shorl Frangois Heisbourg observes,
Europe does not have the military resources to
underpin a common foreign and security policft.
99. National interests remain to the fore and
there is wide disparity between European nations.
u USS err,*f Repo4 published on 2l October 1999,
quoted by AFP (k Monde, 23 October 1999).
According to AFP, US budges (the Pentagon's budget
cornbined with a c€rtain sum from the Energy Minisry)
come to US$ 276.2 bittion for 1999; amourts of US$
280.8 and 300.5 billion are planned for 2000 and 2001
(€262.4 and €285.5 billion). By uay of compariso4
European countries are qp€nding US$ 1,10 biltion (€133
billion) on total de,fence expenditure for 1999. Their
cornbined hdgets are almost hatf that of the United
States.
36 Frfiue operatiors witl place greater emphasis on
projeaing military force rapidly and over long
disunces. The ability to rapidly deploy, sustain and
rccover forces is therefore of critical imporance if
Europeans are to be able to reqpond quickly to futr:re
crises. A mix of sea and airlift are required- Airlift can
move ligtrter forces quickly into theatre while sealift is
required to move heavier forces and to sllstain deploy-
ments. Studies (rumely the British Strategic Defence
Raiew) hane slrown that Eruopean madtime and air
transport forces are imdequate.
" 
*European defence: what are the 'convergence
criteria"'?, AlysonBailes,RUSI Journal, June 1999, pp.
6045.
3t *L'F.".ope de la ddense dans l'Alliance atlantique",
Frangois Heisbourg (President of the Geneva Security
Policy Cenue), Politiqte dtrangdre, 2199, pp. 219-232.
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The idea of convergence criteria for a defence
Europe is aiready accepted by many of thsrn and
could be confirmed in Helsinki, at the next
summit of the European Council on 10 and 1l
Decernber. The first question asked by Alyson
Bailes, WEU's Political Director, quite rightly is
"Converging on what?"3e. Her analysis is an il-
luminating one and is worttr quoting at length
here. She separates out the practical from the
abstract criteria. As she says, it is far from self-
evident whether there is a distinct "European
model" or "European set of values" in the or-
ganisation and conduct of defence, in the same
se,nse in which shared models clearly exist among
the Fifteen for free economic markets, open bor-
ders or dernocratic pluralism. The resulting di-
verslty is easy to map in the percentage of GDP
devoted to defence: Greece 4.8yo, France 2.8yo,
United Kingdom 2.7yo, Germany 1.5%, Spain
1,3W. The amount of (deployable) capability
ttrat nations buy for their money varies evsn more
markedly because of differe,lrt priorities and pro-
portions in qpending. The United Kingdom de-
votes the highest proportions of its state budget
to spending on materiel (27.9% as agains Bel-
gium's 5.4yo), other Europeans geirerally devote
more to personnel-related costs (Spain 69%o,Itdy
72.9% as agains the United Kingdom 37.9%)
and to running expe,nseso'. The nature of the de-
fence inventory 
- 
the choice of tasks to be per-
formed and the level of capability sought in each
of them 
- 
is a major variant: Britaiq France, and
Sweden have maintained a "classic" land/sea/air
ratio of roughly 3:l:1+ but Germany's and It-
aly's navies are relatively smatl and Austria's
non-exisurq while other nations have been
pushed into more specialised niches by radition
and geography as well zN resource limits. Only
Britain and France have aircraft cariers 
- 
aa4
of course, nuclear weapons. Finally, there is the
question of compatibility of technical and pro-
fessional standards and hence of interoperability.
In this malilr,t, Bailes refers to a "lack of tans-
par€ncy on technical issues", such as in ttre data
which Europeans have lodged concerning their
forces "available" to WEU, or the lack of agree-
:%ffiI,,p"it.
o0 Estimates for 1998 (current pdces) published by
NATO on 17 Decenrber 1998 (Press release M-DPC-
2(e8)147).
o1 lbid.
ment on common military requirernents and ma-
terial goals.
100. "Behind this" she observes "lie the thorny
issues of a common European armirmsnts base
and/or common arms procurement agency. Be-
cause of the differe,lrt scales of their defence in-
dustrial capacities, EU members (the sa:ne ap-
plies for WEAG members) have differe,nt practi-
cal starting points here, compounded by different
market orie,ntation and different market experi-
e,nces in rece,rt years. Westem Europe generates
39.9% of world arms sales but34.4%o oftlis is
accounted for by the United Kingdom and
France, while Gennany deliberately cut its share
after reunification from 5%o te I .6yo42 . Factors of
industrial size and sr€ngth heh to e>rplain differ-
ent national policy stances on such choices as
self-supply or off-the-shelf buying, willingness to
run collaborative projects on a competitive mar-
ket basis or insistence on political confiol and
juste retour. But they are further overlaid with
differences of a more structural or philosophical
kind e.g. on state share-holding, on ttre morally
acceptable limits of productioq or on a permis-
sive versus a restrictive approach to the tansfer
of technology and export confiol'/3.
101. tlaving stressed the "different sizes 
- 
dif-
ferent philosophies" of European counties in the
field of armamerf, Ms Bailes rightly states that
"ttre bes! most homoge,neous European capaci-
ties will still be of little s5s rrnls55 their govern-
mexts agree to deploy thern'#. As things stanq
EU members diverge in their views on the tegiti-
macy of armed force in pursuit of non-vital na-
tional interests (including collective EU inter-
ests), in their vision ofthe geographic area across
which Europe's vulnerability aad Europe's re-
sponsibilities are felq in their willingness to sub-
mit their forces to a genuinely multinational
sfructure of command, and in their accepAnce of
the risk of national casualties. If they have di-
verging positions (with no possible quantified
dSo*o: lne Milito-y Balorce 1gg8/gg, trSS Odord
University Press, October I 998.
a3 Bukes, op.cit.a Nicole Gnesouo also discuses this question and
emphasises the urgent needed to evolve tn:e European
diplomary "... ddence is only one part, essenrial but
insuffcient of itse[ of a diptomatic and srategic ex-
pefiise yet to be develo@ ..." in'1,'OTAII et l'Europe
d la lumiere du Kosovo", PolitiEte itr*tgire, 2199,
sunmer 1999, pages 207-218.
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targets to be set for convergence), they also have
different sizes and structures of armies and di-
verging military structures (defence establish-
ment and national decision-taking systems).
I02. Nevertheless, Ms Bailes states, conver-
gence is already happening and will continue, as
a response to both extemal and internal motors
common to European states. The new e,lrviron-
merft now actually derrands more conscious soli-
darity and discipline. The implications of Euro-
pean Monetary Union ought to bring an aware-
ness of shared vulnerability and srengthen com-
mon responsibility, and he,nce the basis for a
co[rmon security response. Financial and eco-
nomic constraints have pushed individual coun-
ties towards rationalisation and specialisation in
defence planning and defence industry conce,n-
fiation. Clear, practical targsts for converge,lrce
should cover: defence spending, stnrcnrral pri-
orities, and technical and equipment goals. [n
Bailes's view it would be "wiser to continue set-
ting and enforcing such quantitative targets pri-
marily in NATO not just because NATO already
does it ... but also in view of the Pandora's box
that would be opened by the EU's starting to
standardise any aspect of its me,mbers' public
spending'{s.
103. However, an equally legitimate point of
view would be that the European Unioru which
has wide e>rperience in defining and handling
converge,nce instruments should be the most suit-
able arena for such an exercise to be ca:ried out.
Heisbourg6 righAy observes that Europe's cap-
ability shortfalls have a distinctly European ori-
gin. Such an observation carries with it a major
political and institutional corollary: since ttre
problem is a European one, it is one that must be
resolved through European decision-making pro-
cesses, bottr national and collective. For defence
matters convergence could come about through
the adoption of converge,:rce criteria or areas of
converge,nce which represent a political commit-
ment on the one hand and through underuking
joint actions on the other. Thus the states con-
cerned could decide to achieve convergence
within a given time-frame (of the order of 5-10
years) on objective criteria that facilitate scaling
down over-blown force stnrctures and modernis-
W,op"it.6 Heisbourg, op.cit.
ing the equipment of more appropriate forces for
projection. Heisbourg suggests for example:
investing in defe,nce (R&D, equipment
procurement) to a level that puts fue-
power and projection capability at the
forefront of the defence effort. The dif-
fere,nces in the defe,nce budgets of the
ten WEU nations, excluding Luxem-
bourg, in terms of the share allocated to
procuremexrl excluding R&D, was in
the ratio of 1:5 in 1997, withthe United
Kingdom investing most (267d and
Belgium least (57");
arrivrng at agreed manpower figures
for the armies of the various European
counfiies, proportionate, for example,
to their total population, to avoid over-
provision which absorbs financial re-
sources more se,lrsibly spelrt on certain
types of equipment;
glv'mg thought to committing them-
selves not to reduce defence spending
as compared with preself levels ex-
pressed as a perc€rilage of GDP in the
case of all EU andWEAG nations. The
ratio of ttre differeirce in the defence
budgets of the 15 EU nations as a per-
cexrtage of GNP in 1998 was 1:4.6
(with the exception of Luxernbourg,
0.870) with Greece the highest spender
at 4.6yo and lreland ttre lowest at 1.0%o.
The defence commitnent of individual
counties could also usefirlly be ex-
pressed in terms of per capita defence
expe,nditure'of the population. The ratio
of the differe,nce n per capita defeirce
expe,lrditure is at preserrt l:3.5, with
France the highest spe,nder at US$ 708,
Finland the median at US$ 381 and
Spainthe lowest at US$ 196.
104. Heisbourg concludes that whether one is
talking about military equipment or convergence
of defence policies, time constants are here
meapured in years or even in decades. However,
he points out that just because the effects of de-
cisions taksn now will be felt in a future that is
more or less distant, does not mean that they can
be delayed, quite the reverseo'. In order to allevi-




and demand in the armaments field6, both gov-
ernments and indusfy must get their act together
now.
(ii) Recent restructuring and position of the
European defence industry with regard to gov-
ernment action
105. A rapid review of Europe's defe,lrce indus-
tries, as compared with the industrial horizon in
the United States, is telling. Europe has four ank
manufacturers, who compste fiercely in foreign
markets agains General Dlmamics Land Sys-
tems of the US. Armoured vehicles are manufac-
tured in Europe by 14 different companies (three
in the US). Europe has 11 finns buildi"g aircraft
(US four) and 11 producrng missiles (US four).
In total, Europe has 750 companies (US 250),
notwithstanding the fact that American defsnce
expenditue is t'wice that of Europeae, As former
UK Secretary of State for Defence George Rob-
ertson points out: '"Today there are too many
manufacturers chasing too liule business. The
European defence industry suffers from duplica-
tion and overcapacity, and faces a difficult future
trying to remain globally competitive (...) it is not
for government to prescribe the route that re-
ffucfuring will take nor the struchrre to e,merge.
That is for industry to decide, based upon its own
commercial judgeme,lrt"5o.
106. Besides the absence of a common pro-
curernent authority or philosophy and the lack of
a harmonised legal frameworh the major chal-
lenges for European defence industries include
asymmetries in their sfiirctures, different kinds of
share structures, and limited pressure from the
stock markeCl. Alongside the efforts of govern-
ments to create conditions conducive to mergers





Talks on broad Er:ropean
defence indusuy consolidation develop s1owlt''by John
flamre, US Deputy Ddence Secretary, Armed Forces
Journal International, June 1999, pr11e46.
so Address W the fonner UK Secretary of State for
Ddence to the Defence and Security FonurL 28 January
1999.t' 
"US eyes only'', Sunjin Williams, Defence procure-
ment Analysi s, Summer 1999, page 17 .
itself is in the vanguard of national and transna-
tional consolidation fie,nds52.
107. In late Decsmber 1998, the new Fre,nch
grouping, Aerospatiale Mafia Flautes Technolo-
gies (MHT)-Dassault Aviation came into being53.
The merger betwe€n British Aerospace (BAe)
and the General Elecuic Company (GEC)-Mar-
coni Group wils announced on 19 January 1999s4
and that between the Spanish company Con-
stnrcciones Aeronariticas S.A. (Casa) and the
Gefinan group DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (Dasa)
on 11 June l999ss.
108. The consolidation of Europe's aerolpace
and defence industries recently took a decisive
step forward. On 14 October 1999 in Strasbourg,
in the presence of Mr Jospin and Mr Schr<ider,
shareholders in the French goup Aerospatiale
Mafia (in which the French state has a 47%o
stake and Lagarddre holds 337o) and the German
goup DaimlerChrysler, which has 100% contol
of Das4 announced that the two groups were to
merge. The new compan% co-chaired by Mr
Lagarddre and Mr Bischofi is called the Euro-
pean Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company
(EADS). With an expected turnover of more than
€21 billion in 1999 and a staff of 89 000, the
new grouping will be the world's ttrird largest
:lerospace, missile and satellite company, behind
Boeing and Lockheed. DaimlerChrysler will have
a 30Yo stake with French interests also account-
rng for 30% (15% for the State, l l%o for La-
gardere and 4%o for other investors) while the
remaining 40% v,-tll be floated on the Paris,
Franktrrrt and Amsterdam stock exchanges.
109. The two groups dready accounted for
some 70%o of pooled turnover (for Airbus, Euro-
copter and Euromissiless), but without the benefit
of any shared political will, as embodied in
Suasbourg by }vlr Jospin and Mr Schroder when
the merger was announceq the deal bstweexl
Aerospatiale Matra and Dasa could not have
gone ahead. Mr Schr<ider emphasised the "global
value of this industrial cooperation as a symbol
t' F"r fir.th* details see Part IV of Assernbty Docu-
menr 1623 "Eurqlean anumerfs restructudng:,, Nov-
ernb€r 1998, paragraphs 69-131.
",L'Armemenf, No. 64, Decerrber 1998, page 45.
" k Figuo,25 June 1999.
5s Le Monde,l4 June 1999.
tu k Figaro,15 Octtrer 1999.
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of Europe's political wi["57 while Mr Jospin
sfiessed that "our two governments have been
steadfast in their will to see this through by en-
couraging the initiatives of our industies every
step of ttre way towards achieving balanced
European consolidation"sE.
110. The merger of Aerospatiale Matr4 Dasa
and Casa should heh with the process of trans-
forming Airbus lndustrie, a European economic
interest grouplng, into a unified company. Nego-
tiations between the parfirers will bring the new
EADS group (with a majority 75.8% stake in
Airbus Industrie) face to face with BAe (with
20y").The Spanish Soup, Cas4 whose merger
with Dasa was announced in June 1999, has been
asked to resume its negotiations with the new
group. If the Spanish company comes in, EADS'
share in Airbus will be 80%. The restructuring of
Airbus is esse,ntial if the European consortium is
to have conaol over its inveshents, industrial
organisation and economic performance. The
merger could also help to firm up the project for
a new European military fiansport aircraft (the
A4001\O which is a real need for most European
countriesse.
I 1I. The Aerospatiale-Dasa merger ha^s shifted
the balance in the European defe,lrce rndustry
which was still so fragmented just a year ago.
Now two major groupings are in the process of
being fomred: EADS, a bi-national company
(with a turnover of €19.8 billion), and BAe-Mar-
coni Elecronics Systems, a British consortium
(with a turnover of Q17.4 billion). There are
many ties between the two groupings. In addition
to Airbus and the Astrium joint vennre being
fonned in the space sector, BAe is tied in with
-' 
t*ttlonar,l6 october 1999.
ss 66drs by the French Prime Mnister, Mr Joqpia in
Strasbourg on 14 Octob€r 1999.
5e Ernopeans havebeen aiscussing for at leas 15 yean
building a European transport atsaft, now called the
A400t{. Officials estimate that orders for at least 200
such aircraft are needed to keep the price, estimated at
more than US$ 80 million each induding dwelopment
costs, low enough to make it worthwhile. France can
probably be counted on to order 50. Germany needs
more than 60 but is seriously considering a version of
the Russian-Ukrainian Anlonw 70. Decisions for or
against the A400M b5, Britain or Gennany are of vital
importance for Europe's mititary transport aircraft pro'
ject See "Eurq)e's de,fence dilef,nma" intlte Finorcial
Tines,19 October 1999.
the new Franco-German group in the missiles
branch (through Matra BAe Dynamics) and in
the production of fighter aircraft through its 36%o
holding in the Eurofighter programmee.
ll2. When it comes to equipment programmes,
EADS is at the core of a European resruduring
policy. As world leader, it will continue to domi-
nate its American competitors in the helicopter
sector, thanks to Eurocopter where Aerospatiale
Matra has a 70Yo stake and Dasa a 30% stake,
thus consolidating cooperation. On the military
aircraft side, EADS wilI have a 40%o holding in
Eurofighter which will be used by the air forces
in Germany, Ita1y, Spain and the United King-
dom. It is also involved 
- 
albeit indirectly
through Aerospatiale Matra which has a 45.8%o
stake in Dassault Aviation 
- 
in production of the
Mirage 2000 and the Rafale. Dasa's holding in
Eurofighter is 30% and this may rise to 44o/o if
the Spanish join in61.
113. The alliance being forged in the missile
sector is eve,n more extensive. The creation of
EADS ha-s 5pssded up the formation of another
European grouping in this area" bringing together
Britislq Frenclq German and Italian interests
around Matra BAe Dynamic which atready holds
30Yo of LFK Dasa's missile subsidiary. The
negotiations with the Italians were completed
rece,ntly. On 20 October in Londorq the United
Kingdom group BAe, the French group Aero-
spatiale Mafia and the Italian group Finmec-
canica officially announced that they were merg-
rng their activities. This will lead to the creation
of the biggest European company in this sector
and the world's second largest group after Ray-
theon in the United States. Wittr a turnover of
€2.5 billion and l0 000 employees, it will be a
joint holding split 50/50 between Aerospatiale
Mata (with a 75% stake) and BAe Qsn on the
one hand andAlenia Marconi Systems (AMS) on
ttre other 
- 
the latter being the result of a parmer-
ship between Finmeccanica, Marconi Electronic
Systems (bought by BAe) and Aerospatiale Ma-
tra's missile subsidiary. The new group's ambi-
tion is to be prime contractor for aII European
missile programmes anq in particular, to be a
force in the market for longdistance air-to-air
missiles (with a range of some 100 hn), this be-
ing the niche in which most customers are inter-
d t*t f"hot,15-16 October 1999.
u' Le Figwo,15 October 1999.
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ested today. The British and French are develop-
ir,g the Meteor missile in ttris key market gea
which will probably dictate the stnrcture of the
new group. The Italians will be involved from
now on and other European countries have also
indicated that they wish to make a contribution,
such as Sweden where the Saab aerospace com-
pany (in which BAe has a 35Yo stake) will be
producing the equipment for the Gripen fighter
aircraft. Germany and Spain have expressed
similar requirements. The European market for
Meteor is estimated at some €3.82 billion. In the
competitive race that has starte4 the UK Minis-
try of Defence is proposing its BVRAAM
(Beyond Visual Range Anti-Aircraft Missile)
programme, this being a long-range air-to-air
missile to be used on its fighter aircraft (both in
its present fleet but above all on its Eurofighters).
The Americans are putting a great deal of pres-
sure on the British to opt for the ERAAM PIus
missile developed by Raytheon (which has of-
fered to share its development with British com-
panies at half the cost of what has been ear-
marked in the United Kingdom defence budget
for this investnent). However, as soon as the
merger was announced, the British, French and
Italian companies received the backing of the
American group, Boeing. Under a transatlantic
agreernsnt, which is the first of its kind, Boeing
will bring the benefit of its expertise to the Me-
teor programme by adapting the European mis-
sile for American aircraft so that it can gain ac-
cess to the US market62.
114. In the space sector, the Astium grouping
is in the process of being formed. It is intended
that it should take over the activities of Matra
Marconi Space (MMS) and Dornier and it will
include the Italian company Alenia Spazio.
EADS is to be the main shareholder of this big
European space company. Astrium will be Eur-
ope's largest space company, with an income of
€2.25 billion and over 8 000 employees in Bri-
tain, France and Germany. EADS is to have a
75Yo slare in Astrium and Marconi a share of
zs%.With ttre combined resources of its part-
ners, Astium will be a fully integrated satellite
company, with earttr observatiorq telecommuni-
cations, launchers and orbital infrastucture as its
dD Mordr,22 October 1999.
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main areas of businesst3. Furthermore, EADS
will have a23.8%o stake in Arianespace and will
become the second biggest shareholder in
Europe's prestigious launcher programme after
the French national space cente (CNES)64.
115. The industrial issues relating to such na-
tional and transnational mergers in European
countries are worth scudying in depth. As regards
the alliance between Dasa and Aerospatiale Ma-
tra, Mr Jospin65 has stressed ttrat "fn looking
after national interests and Europe's gureral in-
terest, this new group will opur the possibility for
further consolidation with its partners in the EU
whom we invite to join us as soon as possible.
This development is fully consistent with the
concept of buitding European defence'tr.
116. This looks like an invitation to resurrect
the plan for a European Aerospace and Defence
Company (EADC) thrown off track by the
merger bstween BAe-GEC Marconi. However, it
would it appear that the European industry is
more in favour of restructuring in such a way as
to create several EADCs. Manyvariables have to
be taken into account:
- 
the critical size necessary to be able to
compste with American gloups;
- 
the need or otherwise to maintain inter-
nal competition within Europe;
- 
the primacy accorded to economic and
political interests and arguments as the
basis for future restructuring.
a B*op.a" venture creates Asriurq a qpace com-
pant'', The Wall Street Joumal Europe, 19 October
1999.
* Le Figaro, 15 October 1999.tt Address by the Frurch Prime Minister in Srasbourg
on 14 October 1999.6 The remaining large European companies that could
uke part in future deals are Alenia (taly) and the
French grcups Dassault and Thomson-CSF (Finwtcial
Times, 15 October 1999). In the European defence elec-
tronics sector, Thomson-CSF is out on a limb foltowing
the r$uffof its attempts to unite with GEC. Although it
remains the leading European group in this sector,
slightiy ahead (with a nmover of US$ 7 billion) of BAe
electronics (US$ 6 billion) and a long way in front of
EADS (US$ 2 billion), it is tlree times smaller than
Raytheon, its American conrpetitor (lc Monde,16 oct-
ober 1999).
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The Americans are aware of the qualitative im-
provemsnts Europeans have achieved through
restnrcturing. They have just responded to the
sequence of realignments inthe defence and aero-
nautics sectors with the unprecedented suggestion
that greater flexibility should be introduced into
the rules on technology fiansfer and foreign in-
vesunent6T.
ll7. Last but not least, one should not forget
the defence industries of cenfral and easem
Europe, most of which are applicants for acces-
sion to the EU. These are the subject of a recent
sardy carried out at the request ofthe European
Commission (DG m 
- 
Industry)6t, dealing with
Bulgaria the Czech Republic, Hungary, Polan{
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, where concen-
tration and privatisation are apparently also un-
der way.
118. As far as the long-term implications of the
process of induscrial reorganisation in progress
for European states are concerred, it should be
noted that this essential reorganisation will pro-
foundly change tlre relationship between private-
sector suppliers and state customers. By way of
illustratiorq the defence sales figure of a group
bringing together Dasa and Aerospatiale Matra
would be in excess of that for the German de-
fence procureme,nt budget, while the defence
sales figure of BAeCEC is actually higher than
the United Kingdom's procursment budget. In
other words with two or three major European
groups to deal wittU it would serve tle fifteen EU
defence ministers well to achieve a corrmon ar-
ticulation of their defence requireme,nt6e.
ll9. While the responsibility for reshaping the
European armamerfs industry lies with the,nt
industrial leaders are aware of the role of na-
tional policies in facilitating the operation of
tansnational businesses. EDIG has prepared a
number of policy papers, one of the most recent
being a Merrorandum on ttre European Defence
e-i[. US Deputy De,fence Secretary, Mr llamre, in-
vitedthe mainEuropean andUS defenoe industry dfds
1s dinner on 25 October 1999 in order to presefi
America's new stratery on globalisation to thern Ze
Monde,27 Octob€r 1999.
* StuCy of the de,fence-related indusries in certain
central and easern European countrieg Ret: EID/971
501186, Final repo+ June 1999, WS/ATKINS Inter-
national.
t' Heisbourg op. crt, page 230.
lndustry, published on 11 February 1999. This
sturunarises the main demands the Europeaa in-
dustry is making of governme,nts.
It recomme,nds that:
(a) a European defence equipment markst
should be recognised as esssntial to pro-
vide the foundation upon which the Euro-
pean defence industry can sustain its glo-
bal competitiveness;
(b) the regulations for this market must
be a competitive and effective framework
for cooperation that avoids unnecessary
duplication of capabilities. The operation
of such a European defe,nce equipment
market will require ttrat partner nations
acce,pt industrial and technological inter-
dependence and apply tranmational bud-
Eetary measures in support;
(c) to establish a broader market base
and to allow European industry to reach
the appropriate level of competitiveness,
access to national markets should be pro-
gressively opened up on a reciprocal and
equitable basis. In the European defence
market, procursrnent of equipment de-
sigre{ developed and produced in Europe
should be preferred. In the case of pro-
curernents from outside Europe, effective
reciprocal access to, and treatnexf within,
the appropriate oversqu market should be
a prerequisite;
(d) the harmonisation of military opera-
tional requirements is made the single
most vital action for future progress. In
parallel the harmonisation of specific Ie-
gal and procurexnexrt procedures and stan-
dards will also have to be achieved. The
European defence indusury has the cap-
abiliry to advise and assist in this process;
@ a comprehe,nsive European Research
and Technology policy should be estab-
lished to secure the future of the European
technological industial base. This should
be based on long-term civil and military
invesunent programmes to support the
identified 'key technologies" that must be
sustained in Europe. This could be ach-
ieved by implerrenting a concept of Euro-
36
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pean economic security through an Office
for Economic Security, or a specially ap-
pointed Advisory Committee, which could
build upon the collaborative technology
progranrmes of WEAG and the Frame-
work Programmes ofthe European Union;
(fl a prograrrme of funded European de-
monstrator progammes should be launch-
ed to build upon the results of the pro-
posed long-term joint civil and military
critical technology programme ;
(g) he European defe,nce industry should
receive tlrc full political and military sup-
port of the European govemments in its
activities in the world defence equipment
market. In the particular case of exports
contols it is importantthat:
- 
the supply of defsnce equipmelrt to
European govemments within the
European domestic market is unre-
stricted;
- 
the supply of equipment and sub-
systems to European counties with-
in the European domestic market
should be achieved through global
export licences;
- 
the supply of compone,lrts to Euro-
pean companies within the Euro-
pean domestic market should be un-
restricted;
- 
until a European export policy for
sales outside of the domestic market
has been agree( and a European
authority has been given the re-
sponsibiliry to apply iq such sales
should be contolled by the nation of
the exporting company;
administrative expoft procedures
should be simplified and harmonised
:N soon as possible.
120. It is in ttris context of major political
change and the prese,m e,lrdeavours to achieve
industial rationalisation described above, that
work on a European Armarnents Agency is pro-
gressrng and the principal guidelines for the fu-
ture of armamsnts cooperation are being shaped.
2. Work in progress on the EM
an d p o st-C olo gne s cen arios
(a) Work in progress on the EAA: the Masterplan
for the EuropeanArmaments Agenq
l2l. The idea of a European Armaments Ag-
ency was launched over seven years ago. On 10
December 1991, in the Declaration of WEU
member states on the role of WEU and its rela-
tions with the EU and the Atlantic Alliance,
which is part of the Final Act of the lntergov-
ernmental Conference held in Maastricht, minis-
ters reached agreeme,ff on "enharced cooperation
in the field of armaments with the aim of creating
a European Armaments Agency''.
122. From 1993 to 1995 an Ad Hoc Study
Group investigated the role of a European Ar-
maments Agency (EAA) and the preconditions
for sening up such an agsncy in pursuance of the
1991 Maasricht Treaty. The Ad Hoc Study
Group (AHSG) was created to review the pos-
sibilities of enhancing armaments cooperation
with the aim of creating an EAA. Due to the
political legal and economic conditions that sur-
rounded the mission (lack of agreerne,lrt after
more than three years of negotiations on common
procurernent rules and regulations), the Group
did not recommend the setting up of a fully
fledged EAA at that time. National Armaments
Directors recognised that in fact the precon-
ditions (for example, European regulations gov-
erning an armaments market and a cohere,lrt Eur-
opean Defence Policy to form the basis for Eur-
opean armamsnts cooperation) had not yet been
met, but that a precursor to the European Aflna-
ments Agency with a limited brief in respect of
ma::agement of Research and Technology act-
ivities would be usefuI.
123. A Charter for the Western European Ar-
milments Organisation (WEAO) was agreed by
the WEAG defence ministers and adopted by the
WEU Council of Ministers in autumn 1996. Un-
der this Charter, the Research Cell (RC), as the
initial Executive Body of the WEAO was sst up
as a WEU subsidiary body in 1997. Bottr the
Charter and the MoU on the WEAO-RC contain
the provision that "when WEAG Ministers de-
cide that the conditions for moving to a firll EAA
are met, it is the intelrtion that this fuency will
become the Executive Body and will absorb the
Research Cell" (Article 4.1 of the MoU and Ar-
ticle 12 (b) of the Charter).
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124. WEAG is still wrestling with the prelimi-
naries of bringing to fruition the idea of a com-
mon European Armaments Agency, in pursuance
of the i99l Maasricht Treaty. WEAG's policy
in rece,nt years has been first to create the right
kind of conditions and a framework of regula-
tions before sening up a fully fledged EAd over
and above the self-imposed limits of the existing
WEAO-RC. While this process was ssnsible in
itself, it proved too slow to keep pace with the
rapidly developing problems facing the European
arma:nents market: :rmong thern reduced defence
budgets, continuing industial overcapacities and
giant industrial mergers in the US fostered by a
homoge,nous market and a strong customer at
home.
125. ln November 1997, at their Erfiut meet-
ing, WEAc'ministers discussed how progress
could be made towards more effective European
armaments cooperation using the aim of a Euro-
pean Annaments Agency as a means to better
coordinate European efforts. They agreed that a
plan, including a timetable, should be developed
to guide furttrer steps. The "Masterplan for the
European Armamexils Agency''was dweloped in
1998. Attheir meeting in Rome on 17 November
1998, ministers agreed on the Masterplan as the
basis for further development and actions to-
wards the EAA and welcomed the establishment
of a Group of National Experts for the perform-
ance of studies and further developme,nt of the
Masterplan. The Group of National Experts was
inaugurated on I Dece,nrber 1998 and has since
enrbarked upon a series of monthly meetings.
126. The first draft documents produced by the
Group were due to be prese,nted and discussed at
the Ocoober 1999 meeting of the NADs and the
November meeting of WEAG ministers. They
primarily concern:
a detailed description of EAA func-
tions;
principles and policies to govem EAA
procurement;
a generic structure forthe EAA;
a proposal on "pilot projects".
With regard to the way to proced it is antici-
pated that at the NADs and ministers' meetings
in autumn 2000, the National Experts Group will
be in a position to submit a full range of propos-
als on the principles and lines of conduct govern-
ing ail EAA functions and a dstailed generic
sffucture. The aim is to complete the work of the
Group bytle autumn of 2001.
(i) Content of the Masterplan
127. The Masterplan for the European Arma-
ments Age,ncy was fust submitted to the defence
ministers on 17 November 1998. Nonvithstand-
ing the fact it was set by the Maastricht Treaty
as a political objective, the EAA is not an eird in
itself. It must provide added value in economic
terms by otrering services that alleviate the bur-
de,n on me,nrber nations' own a&ninisuation and
organisation. The implementation of a "pilot pro-
jecc'70 is considered beneficial in order to build
up the Agency and prove its concept. It is en-
visaged ttrat the EAA will be an organisation
se,parate from the national governments of par-
ticipant counfies, but that it will nonetheless be
subject to political contol by WEAO nations
and/or by participating nations of partnership
programmes. The task of defining the scope of
the delegation of authority which should rea-
sonably be given to the EAA is addressed in the
Masterplan.
128. Inthe Masterplan the following three main
areas of work are identified:
measures providing for the legal and
political framework for the EAA out-
side WEAG's authority (i.e. maintyEU
activities) but with WEAG cooperation
and input;
definition of policies and principles
forming the basis for the operation of
the agency within WEAG's authority.
This means in esssnce the establish-
ment of acquisition rules (procurement
regulations for an EAA 
- 
PREAA) and
a plan for compatibility of operation
between OCCAR and EAA;
- 
measures providing for the adminisra-
tive and operative basis for the EAA to
be defined by WEAG comprising, for
%-qpriog 1999, WEAG Panel I uas asked by the
NADs to prcpose collaborative pilot projects for the
EAA in accordanoe with the prwisiors of the
Maserplan The proposed pilot projects are: the Future




exanrple, the organisational structure
and budgetary and personnel issues.
129. The Masterplan's timetable encompasses
the following progftunme of action: preparatory
studies and proposals are to be developed for
submission for approval in November 1999. The
Group of National E:iperts (GNE) is in charge of
identifting procurement policies and principles
which cover such fundamental issues as ar-
rangemsnts for work-shares and preservation of
national defence industrial bases. The GNE also
deals with R&T policy, involvement of observer
countries, liaison with other armame,nts agencies
and cooperation with the EU/EC until November
2000.
130. The Group of National Experts will then
move on to draw up a business stategy for the
EAA5 including contlact managexnent, organisa-
tion stnrcture and sta^ffing principles. It will also
identify a list of potential pilot projects, draw up
terms of reference (TORS) for tasks to be dele-
gatedto the EAA" and draftthe formal documen-
tation needed to facilitate observer participation
and incorporate tlre EAA into the WEU/EU. An
organisation chart will be submitted by tle GNE
in time for the autumn confereirce in the year
2000, which makes it possible to proceed with
the nomination of the initial core staff of the
agency and with the preparation of budgets
which will also include proposals on a location
for the EAA. Assuming the NADs and ministers
agree with the GNE's proposals in November
2000, it will then move towards preparing for
implementation and the establishment of the
EAA. Work would concentrate on identifying fin-
ancial, capital and staffrequirefiients and seeking
final approval ofthe necessary legal document-
ation.
131. The WEAO Charter outlines the Agency's
range ofactivities, to include: researclq procure-
men! studies, management of asssts and other
functions. The concept of a business strategy has
to address both the Agency's commercial consti-
tution and procedures (e.g. management tech-
niques, philosophy on control), and acquisition
strategies, which have to be flexible in order to
cope with the changing demands of each new
project. The business strategy must ensure the
utnost efficiency in terms of an optimal cost-
benefit ratio. The GNE will also have to consider
tasks, that can be delegated from nations to the
EAd including the identification of a represen-
tative pilot project.
132. The EAA's objectives need to be trans-
lated into practical guidelines to be agreed as
fonnal annexes to the WEAO MoU. Other areas
to be looked at under the policy-work package
include:
- 
possibilities for rntegrating observers
into WEAO activities;
work on future harmonisation of Euro-
pean arnurments activities carried out
by the EU institutions;
a contribution to the development of
principles leading to greater community
betwee,n WEAG nations, a Code of
Conduct on harmonised application of
Article 2231296 of the Rome/Amster-
dam Treaty and common understanding
on state aid and export policies;
constructive rationalisation implies a
single agency. Compatibility of both
OCCAR and WEAO have to be exam-
ined and figure as a task in the Mas-
terplan's "policy" area of work.
(ii) Futurefunctions of the EAA
133. The EAA could support any collaborative
action in Europe designed to ensure that ttre
armed forces of the European nations are prop-
erly equipped for their recognised needs. It could
well provide the armed forces of European na-
tions with the defence goods they need and which
their respective governments may wish to de-
velop, procure, maintatL supply and dispose of
through such an agency. In the field of defence
Research and Technology activities, the EAA
could manage R&T including technology dan-
onstrator progranrmes (which are essential for
skills maintenance over the longer term) and sup-
port for coordination of long-term technical re-
quirements. It could also provide support in the
formulation of technical specifications in relation
to agreed operational requirements and lead to
better application of the relevant MoUs (e.g.
EUCLID, THALES, Test Facilities). In the field
of defence equipment procurement, the EAA
could manage the agreed national and coopera-
tive equipment programmes and off-the-shelf
procurement, in-service support and the formu-
lation ofdesign specifications. Studies could also
39
DOCUMENT 1671
be conducted within the EAA. These might in-
clude Technology Surdies in support of the har-
monisation of operational requirements. The
EAA would also be suited to manage assets and
facilities. Other functions might be necessary in
order to achieve the aims of the EAA (such as
support to amumexrts exports or common use of
Article 2231296 of the Rome/Amsterdam Treaty
to enhance armirmeflfs cooperation in Europe.
The initial decisions to be take,n concern the de-
scription of functions as such, the authority of
Board of Direcuors, Agency and Partnerships, the
Principles and Policies necessary overall, and
notably those which are so fundamental that they
need to become ame,ndments to the WEAO MoU.
(b) The future of WEAG and post-Cologne
scenarios
(i) The future of WEAG in the evolving Euro-
pean s ecurity architecture
134. On the initiative of the Greek WEAG
Chair, the WEAG Sta^ff Group has been tasked
to zubmit a proposal to NADs on the future of
WEAG in the evolving European security archi-
tecture fo[owing the Cologne European Council
Declarationo with a view to preparing a recom-
me,ndation for the meeting of WEAG defence
ministers in Luxembourg on 22 Novernber 1999.
Since the aim of WEAO is to assist in promoting
and enhancing European armame,lrts cooperation,
in accordance with policies agreed by WEAG,
this study also considers the consequences for the
future of WEAO. Staff Group reflections on the
future ofWEAGAtr/EAO were based on an initial
document issued by the WEAG NADs' Chair-
man. Consideration was also given to WEU
Asse,nrbly Recomme,ndatiot 5M to the WEU
Council on 'TIEU after the Washington and
Cologne Summits", and to the work already un-
dertaken within WEAG and WEAO on this sub-
ject. With regard to the Cologne Declaration, the
Staff Group noted that while the Cologne Euro-
pean Council recognised the need to undertake
sustained efforts to sffengthein the Defence
Indusrial and Technological Base @ITB) and to
seek further progress in the harmonisation of
military require,rne,nts and the planning and pro-
curexnent of arms, no mention is made of how
those objeoives are to be achieved.
135. Therefore the Steering Group considers in
particular that:
there rsmains a need for a forum with a
political dimension, directed by defence
ministers, in which all European na-
tions involved in the creation of the
European Security and Defence lden-
tity may discuss together all aspects of
amumsnts cooperation and undertake
coop erative activities ;
- 
the existing WEAG MEAO stnrcture
and organisation, in which the full
members are entitled to participate
fuIly and with the same rights and re-
sponsibilities, and in which decisions
are taken on a consensus basis, pro-
vides the most appropriate arrangexnent
to fulfil that requirement;
- 
the objectives of WEAG, na:nely more
efficient use of resources throtryfio inter
alia, increased harmonisation of re-
quirements, the opening up of national
defe,nce marksts to cross-border com-
petition, strength€rxing of the European
defe,nce industrial and technological
base, cooperation in research and de-
velopmeng are still valid. The need for
progress towards these objectives has
become evsn more pressing in recent
years because of reductions in defence
budgets, the increasing pace oftechno-
logical change, and the widening tech-
nology gap, in certain areas, betwee,n
US and European defence capabilities;
- 
the oppornrnity sill exists to make use
of WEAO's legal capacrty to place
confiasts, to further dwelop common
activities, including procur€xnent. There-
fore furttrer efforts should be made
towards the establishment of the EAA
based on the work of the Group of
National Experts on the Masterplan;
the political opportrnity remains to
continue the progressive opening up of
WEAGMEAO activities to other Eur-
ope:m nations within ttre framework of
the European Amnrnelrts ParErership,
and to further consider allowing them
the possibility of becoming WEAG full
me,mbers.
136. Taking account of the above, the Staff
Group considers the following two options are




to keep the prese,lrt special status for
WEAG MEAO activities. This would
raise significat long-term political and
strort-term administrative issues and im-
plies the allocation ofthe necessary res-
ources for mafutaining such autonomy.
- 
to take forward their activities under
the umbrella of the EU. This solution
could allow arnixnents cooperation
gradually to come within the Commu-
nity machinery and be more closely
connected with dwelopments under the
CFSP.
137. On the basis of the above initial findings,
and in the light of rece,nt political developme,nts,
NADs were invited to recommend to ministers to:
confirm their commitnelrt to maintain
WEAG as the sole European arma-
ments cooperation forum and to retain
it under the political direction of de-
fe,nce ministers;
confirm their willingness to develop
further WEAG activities, as well as
those of its executive a4:ilcy, WEAO,
and to improve the efficiency and scope
of the activities conducted in common
so as to bstter meet the agreed objec-
tives, including the eve,lrtual establish-
ment ofthe EAA;
reaffi.rm tlnt atl WEAG fulI merrbers
will continue to be entitled to partici-
pate fully i, ary future .urangemexf in
the field of European armaments coop-
eration that might evolve from WEAG/
WEAO, and with the sa:ne rights and
responsibilities as currently enjoyed;
reaffirm their decision to opsn pro-
gressively arrnaments cooperation ac-
tivities to other European nations
through the European Armaments Part-
nership, and agree to offer thsm the
possibility of full me,nrbership once rhe
necessary conditions a^re met.
(ii) Post-Cologne scenarios: integration of the
institutionol framework of the future EAA into
the EU, status quo or development of an EAA
outside the EU
138. Gven the multiplicrty of existing coopera-
tion frameworks and the complexity of the way
they interloch the temptation might be to start
from scrarch and set up an entirely new frame-
work. However that solution is unlikely. It is
necessary, therefore, to try and imagine what
future sce,narios might consist of. The govern-
ments arc to make a statement on the future of
WEAG and post-Cologne sceirarios for arma-
me,nts cooperation. Four options are possible. If
the fust is selected, the decision is straightfor-
ward: WEAGAVEAO would be the linchpin in
setting up an "Armamsnts Europe" under Euro-
pean Union auspices (Option A). If the second is
the one chose,n WEAGNIEAO wiU remain as it
is without coming under the European Union
framework (Option B). The third would involve
reconstituting an independe,lrt fonrm along the
lines of the IEPG, supported by a volunteer host
country or national government (Option C). Un-
der the fourth option the governments would dis-
solve WEAGAIIEAO (Option D).
139. Option A involves integrating WEAG and
WEAO afinaments structures into the European
Union. Give,n that the heads of state and govern-
ment have decided that the European Union
should have the necessary capabilities and stnrc-
tures to enable it to take constructive decisions in
the area of crisis management, one might envis-
age the formation within the European Union of a
struchrre responsible for bringing a European
armaments markeq or more generally a European
defence equipment market (EDEM) into being. A
mixed Community and intergovernmental ap-
proach might possibly be envisaged. Decisions
concenring the main objectives and the overall
strategy for implementing that policy might be
taken at intergovernmental level, in other words
in the Union's second pillar. The firs pillar, the
European Commission, could be made respon-
sible for its practical implemelrtation.
140. We should recall that under all the options
referred to, setting up an armaments structure
within the European Union would raise the
problem of who should belong to it and, in par-
ticular, the attitude that WEAG countries which
are not EU members should adopt towards it. A
high-level working group was tasked by EU de-
fence ministers in Bonn on 28 May 1999 to took
into the matter. To the best of your Rapporteur's
knowledge no outcome (statemenq mandate or
progress repofl has been published.
141. lntegration into the EU could be via the
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first (Option A 1) or dre second pillar (Option A
2), in other words:
(Option A 1) Under the first pillar, the
European Armarnents Agency would
become a Directorate-General of the
Commission with one or two special
features Qinks with the EU's future
Political and Security Committee and
future Military Commiuee and with the
permane,nt representative of the High
Representative/SecretaryCeneral of ttre
Council). The first pillar offers a trad-
ition of cohesion and solidarity, while
the second, where political influence
holds stong sway, leaves more room
for horse-tading between states and a
greatsr diversity of stances. Integration
within the first pillar in this way would
have significant legal implications, such
as the European Court of Justice hav-
ing jurisdiction over the EU market,
possible European Parliament influence
on lines of conduct falling within the
purview of the first pillar, possible
scrutiny by the European Court of
Auditors of EU operations and finan-
ces, granting of fuIl legal personality
for market supervision and legal pro-
cedures. The European Armaments
Agency may well become a special
fonn of Directorate4eneral with Com-
munity funding Bringing armaments
into the first pillar requires the con-
vening of an intergovernmental con-
ference (lGC), a scenario which doubt-
less would encounter opposition from
the majority of European govemments
which want armamexils to remain an
intergovernmental responsibilitv.
(Option A 2) Armaments structures
would be integrated into ttre second
pillar. The second pillar is synonymous
with intergovenrmental management.
WEAO is a WEU subsidiary body and
as such has legal personality. Depend-
ing on WEU's evolution after 2001, the
EAA could be set up in WEAO, which
would remairU for a transitional period,
within WEU. Consideration of the
eventual transfer of WEAO (which
would incorporate the Research Cell
and the possible EAA) into the Euro-
pean Union's second pillar should not
lose sight of the matter of its legal per-
sonality. Throughout the period of time
between Maasricht and Amsterdam,
the EU second pillar did not have a
well-defined legal personality. After
Amsterdam a "mini" Iegal personality
was granted, but this was insufficient
to allow it to award contracts and ten-
ders under the internal legal frame-
works of the EU member states. One
solution might be to incorporate ttrc
wording ofthe Paris Agreements within
the second pillar or strengthen the lat-
ter's legal personality, which would
again imply organising an IGC.
142. It is possible to conceive, within the sec-
ond pillar 
- 
alongside the Political and Security
Committee, which will have oversight of the
whole range of issues relating to the CFSP, and
the Military Committee, which is to have re-
sponsibiliry for support to the Political and Se-
curity Commiuee and bringing together the
Chiefs of Defence Statr 
- 
of an Armamslts
Committee at the level of the National Arma-
ments Directors (NADs) which would report to
the General Affiairs Council and on which de-
fence ministers would sit. The Armirments Com-
mittee, supported by sub-committees, could be
tasked with drawing up policy guidelines to be
put to the General Affairs Council for approval.
The European Commission which could set up
an amamsnts service or directorate, could be
made responsible for implementing this global
strategy.
143. The developme,nt and implementation of
this European arrn:Lments policy within the
European Uniorq which would essentially be di-
rected towards the creation of a genuine Euro-
pean defence equipment market (EDEM), should
be a gradual progress and deal in the first place
with specific issues such as security of supply,
intra-Community transfers or freedom to tender.
144. However, the integration within the policy
pillar strucrures that have commercial responsi-
bilities risks raising diffi culties :
- 
the Commission, as the guarantor of
the single market, is likely to resist
such a derogation. At the first invita-
tion to tender it would lay the matter
before the European Court of Justice
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(as it did in the case of dual-use goods,
see paragraph a\;
with regard to invitations to tender, the
machinery set up in OCCAR and
EUCLID constitutes precedents which
are difficult to accornmodate within the
policy pillar.
I45. By conffast within the second pillar (Op-
tion A 2) there would certainly be the possibility
of exploring some kind of modus vivendi rec-
ogmsing WEAG's identity and achievements.
WEAG could continue as an informal discussion
forum for armaments questions not dealt with
withinthe EU armaments framework.
146. Option B would involve WEAG MEAO
being maintained intact without being integrated
into the EU frameworh with the lauer being free,
if it so wished, to create its own armamsnts
structure. Provided WEU's legal personality con-
tinues to exist (by virnre of the Paris Agree-
ments) WEAGNIEAO will continue to operate
normally. Even if all other parts or functions of
WEU are fransferred to the EU, it is always
possible to rstain the WEU legal framework in
order to achieve WEAGAMEAO objectives. [n-
deed, this would settle the matter of menrbership,
in other words the position of those countries
which are mernbers of WEAG without belonging
to the European Union. "Double-hatted" Ambas-
sadors in Brussels with a dual reirrit could be the
vehicle used for the purpose of discharging the
functions of the Council when necessary (as was
the case in London). But there is also the issue of
the administrative support provided by WEU.
147. Under Option C, Governments might con-
sider secting up an IEPG-type framework again.
The return to ilre IEPG (independent forum) era,
could be done with support from a volunteer
country (like IEPG have in Lisbon or FINA-
BEL71 in Brussels) but this would imply a return
to the legal position that prevailed during
iT-p514gp1:def 
actointernationalassociation/fonrm
set up in 1953, which now brings together the Army
Chiefsof-Statr of the following countries: BelgunL
Fran@, Germany, Iuly, Luxenrbourg the Netherlands,
Spain andthe UnitedKingdon FINABEL has no legal
personality. It draft proposals and recommendations for
standardising ground defence equipmenL Its proceed-
ings can only be passed to interested governments
though their own delegates, i.e. the Army Chiefsof-
Statr
EUCLID Stage I, in other words recoruse to the
legal personalrty of the framework nation. Re-
course might also be had to a national authority
(UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
(DERA) or ilte French Del6gation Gen6rale pour
I'Armement (DGA), or to an association under
Belgan law. In the latter case there would de-
internationalisation and privatisation of defence
which would no longer be public property.
148. Option D: if defence ministers decide to
dissolve WEAG/\IIEAO onthe grornas that it no
longer has a role in Europe and should make
room for other fora or organisations better equip-
ped to bring about greater cooperation between
European governments, the execution of such a
decision will require a period of at least three
years to wind up all WEAGAilfEAO commit-
msnts. Should those bodies cease to exist, their
responsibilities might be transferred to NATO.
149. The creation wiftin the EU of a new insti-
tution totally separate from present initiatives
concerning an EAA, wittr the existing sEuctures
remaining to boot would be the worst of all
worlds. It would lead to a proliferation of fora
and growing duplication. The creation of a new
institution accompanied by the disappearance,
pure and simple, of other cooperation frame-
works would be tantamount to wasting a greal
deal of energy and know-how.
150. It is difficult to see how the pursuit of
some form of coexistence bstwesn OCCAR and
WEAO would be eittrer viable commercially or
in tune with ttre political will expressed in the
Maastricht Treaty. Constructive rationalisation
can only meet with success if the dsmands of the
WEAGNIEAO member countries are channelled
through a single agency and not spread across a
number of different organisations.
l5l. Even within an EAA integrated into the
European Union first pillar, WEAG could be the
prime contact for the EU authorities involved
(POLARM and the European Commission) and
the originator of an armaments policy and com-
mon rules and procedures. krdeed an EAA can-
not by itself draw up an armaments policy. It
must be supported in this area by a European
political authority 
- 
in other words WEAG.
Alongside this political forurq supported by
administrative strucfures, the EAA's operational
side could be developed. In order to achieve this
the WEAO Charter would have to be amended so
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that alongside the Research Cell with responsi-
bility for Research and Technology, the EAA
would have to incorporate in its internal architec-
ture both logistical aspects and OCCAR, with
responsibility for development and procurement
of defence goods. Perhaps the best option would
be for OCCAR also to be integrated into that
internal sfructure as this would have the advan-
tage of preserving an intergovenrme,ntal stucture
within a format appropriate to armaments coop-
eration and the necessary ties with other EU
bodies, in particular the European Commission,
so that in the long run it would be possible to
move towards a singlg European amuments
policy within the European Union.
M Conclusions
L52. A rece,nt statemexrt by France's armamexfs
chief Jean-Yves Helmer, seems to sum up the
essential points: "If cooperation tlrough pro-
grarnmes between states is far from perfect 
- 
as
recent difficulties over the TRIMILSATCOM
satellite telecommunications syst€rn, the Horizon
Frigate or the infantry combat vehicle show 
- 
the
ways to improve it have been identified. They
consist, in ttre first place, in facilitatiry collective
expression of European states' long-term re-
quirements by entering into basic exchanges
about a 3O-year forward plan. Nex! tlre number
ofjoint research prograrnmes must be increasd
an essential step at a time when united States
expenditure on defence research and technology
is three times greater than European budgets
taken together, in order to bring together areas of
study, redundancy and paving the way for futrue
cooperation. Finatly the Joint Armamerf Coop-
eration Organisation now known as OCCAR
must be given every chance of success ..."72.
153. [f European states wish to preserve a Eur-
opean capability in defence technology and the
related developme,nt and production capacities,
they need to be quick to offer their industries
advantages comparable to those that already ex-
ist in North Anrerica. They need to organise
therrselves as homogenous European customers
for defe,nce materiel, harmonising their military
requirements so as to make possible sizeable and
D 
"ta OC+ evolutions et perspectines", Jean-Ives
Helmer, DLfense Nationale, No. 10, October 1999,
pages 5567.
economic production runs. General Schliepe/3
has argued that what is needed in respect of
European armamsnts in order to achieve our
DffB and EDEM goals is a homoge,nous market,
one customer and just enough producers to allow
for competition. Govemments will creat€ that
single customer bymeans of an EAA".
154. In order to arrive at that positioq what
will the model chose,n for integration be? There
are a number of ways of looking at this. One
possibility would be to continue to dwelop coop-
eration onanad hocbasb according to variable
geometry, opting for a degree of political laissez-
faire and an institutional status quo as far as
existing intergovernmetrtal frameworks of co-
operation are concemed. At the other exffeme,
another solution would be to work to an arrrbi-
tious integration model which would span the
whole distance from integration of defe,nce mar-
kets at European level to sening up zupranational
for managing those markets by reviv-
ing the idea of a European Aerospace and De-
fence Company (EADC) and taking a decision to
set up a single EAA under ttrc auspices of the
European Union. ln view of the industrial envi-
ronment and the extreme urge,ncy of the need for
a rationalisation of both supply and demand, the
first assumption must be discarded. The condi-
tions do not exist for the second "federalist" so-
lution to come about. A tlftd solution ttrerefore
remains, which is merely to allow the process
currently under way at the industrial, intergov-
ernmental and Community levels to continue.
This is the most likely scenario. The change in
the attitude of governmeirts, bonrc out by the
process launched at the Cologne Summiq might
pave the way for a more ambitious model for in-
tegration in keeping with the specific needs of the
industry. Despite the complexity of the process
and the confiadictions it entails, govenrments and
the industry are now aware of the need to pursue
initiatives directed towards implementing an
armamerlts Europe in a sustained manner.
I55. The defence industry is crossing the
threshold to the third miUennium at a mome,nt of
extrexne instability. [n order to deal with such
circumstances, the industry is increasingly feel-
rAdd*-r given bD/ Divisonal Creneral Andries
Schlieper, Chairmart National Exp€rts Group, on'"The
firune European Annaments Agenqy'', Air & Space
Europe conference, k Bourget, 17 June 1999.
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ing the need to look beyond the solution of ad
hoc cooperaion and is increasingly doing so on
its own initiative. At government level, notwith-
standing the delays and obstacles referred to in
this report, signal progress is undoubtedly being
made. Despite the obstacles that still lie in the
way of a European Armaments Ageircy, most
countries want to move forward. Finally, for the
fust time in the history of European integratiorq
initiatives leading to a European armaments pol-
icy have been launched by the European institu-
tions. In the time that has elapsed between
Maasricht and Amsterdarn and Cologne, the idea
has matured considerably. The foundations for a
co[rmon armamexrts policy have now been laid.
The consultation phase has been succeeded by
one of preparation and developme,lrt of the in-
strumerlts to implement it. But what of the politi-
cal will?7a The actions of Mr Solana, the CFSP
High Represeirtative and Mr PatterU the EU
Commissioner for External Affairs, could act as
a catalyst to the revival of Europe's defence
ambitions. There would appear to be an aware-
ness at the highest political level of the qrgeirt
need to build a defe,nce Europe. Atthe same time,
the climate of confidence necessary for establish-
ing a common foreign and security policy and a
cofirmon amaments policy now appears to exist.
The fact that the Europeans have increasingly
similar mission objectives could ultimately lead
to harmonisation of military docuines and mem-
ber states, facrng the sa:ne risks and tlreats, be-
coming increasingly interdepeirdelrt.
156. Some feel ttrat a common foreign and se-
curity policy is an essential condition for the es-
tablishment of a common armaments policy.
Conversely, there is an alternative view which
maintains that a defence pillar that was economi-
cally motivated would facilitate the formation of
a European defence identity. Indee4 the machin-
ery for sefting up just such a pillar has been set
in motion, albeit without agreqnent having been
reached among governments on the ultimate ob-
jective: the creation of an armame,nts Europe.
T S*tlteoail+op. cit.
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After the single currency and in the light of the
Cologne Summit and its potential repercussions,
ttrat objective could become the challenge facurg
tomorrow's Europe. Even in 1997, the Fre,nch
Prime Minister was saying that countries which
were to share the same coinage could not forever
maintain separate defence policiesTs. Or in the
words of one commentator: there is no existing
example intlre world of a power, of a community
which, whatever its economic strength, has sur-
vived without making provision for its own se-
curity 
- 
in other words ensuring it has ttre means
to defsnd itself. This nrle is also tue of Europe,
which can look to no-one but itself to defend it.
To be tuly effective, any fonn of defence must
be independent, at least up to a poin! and can
only find real expression through the forces, per-
sonnel and equipment ttrat are its own to com-
mandft.
157. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, talks
of a breakthroug[ as yet to be firmed up: 'IMhen
we began ttre European defe,lrce debate at Pdrt-
schach in Austia and then followed it wittr the
Saint Malo Declaratiorq there was rightty a sense
of optimism. It was a breakthrough. But it is only
a start. There is much talk of structures. But we
should begin with capacities. To put it blunfly, if
Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs
modern forces, sfrat€gic lift, and the necessary
equipment to conduct a campaign. No nation will
ever yield up its sovereip right to determine the
use of its own armed forces. We do, however,
need to see how we caJl cooperate bemer, com-
plement each other's capabilities, have a fi.rll
range of defence options ope,n to us. This also
mearrs greater integration in the defence industry
and procurement. If we were in any doubts about
this before, Kosovo should have removed
thern"??. This is as clear and authoritative a
stat€rnent as there could be on the need for de-
fence Europe.
u Addrc* by Uonel Josprn, IHEDN, 4 September
I 997, cited by Daussage and Comrl op. cit. page 2M.
75 
'1'F,rrope de l'annernent, hier, aujourd'hui et de-
main", Emile Blanc, Revue de I'Armement, No. 61,
March 1998.
" 'T\e new challenge for Europe", addrcss by Tony
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Ausria Obs Obs M EAPC
Beleium M M M M
Bulsaria AP EAPC
Canada M
Czech Republic AM M
Denmark Obs M M M
Estonia AP EAPC
Finland Obs Obs M EAPC
France M M M S M M
Germany M M M S M M




Italy M M M S M M
Latvia AP EAPC
Litluania AP EAPC
Luxembourg M M M M
Netherlands M M M M
Norwav AM M M
Poland AM M




Spain M M S M M
Sweden Obs Obs S M EAPC
Turkey AM M M















Westem European Union (1954)
Western European Annaments Group (1992)
Western European Armaments Organisation ( I 995)
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (1996)
Signatory states of the Letter of lotent (LoI) dated
6 July 1998
European Union











7'oble setting out the main military equipment programmes currently being conducted in cooperation between European countries
Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
TRIGAT-LR (long range)
AC3G/LP















the dcvelopmcnt phasc of




The TRIGAT-LR is a 3rd gcncration long-range
anti-tank missilc (5000 m): rcplacemcnt for
HOT dcsigncd as a fire and forgct missile.
It is intendcd to cquip the Gcrman UH-T and
French HACI and cxport vcrsions of the Tigcr
helicopter, and can also be fittcd in tracked
vehicles.
Complction of devclopment and test firing is
schcduled for 2002.
France has dccided not to take part in
production of thc missilc but intends to procced
to competitive tcndcr for subsequcnt
procuremcnt. (Frcnch National Asscmbly,
Opinion 1864, Volumcs IV and VIII: "Forccs
Tcrrestrcs" and "Crddits d'6quipcment",
t4ltolge).










consortium set up by
Acrospatialc, Dasa and
o The TRIGAT-MR is a 3rd gcneration mcdium-
rangc anti-tank missile (2000 m). A portable
missilc cffcctivc against both thc latest hcavy
tanks with the most modcrn rcactivc armour and
any manocuvring land-bascd targct or lowlevel















Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
BAc/l\4BD.
The production contract





Ministry of Defence, end-
r eee).
The TRIGAT-MR




aerotcrrestrial targe;L Round the clock, all-
weather effectivencss in urban or suburban
environments.
The cntire programme covers 1570 fire points
and 35 000 ordinance Q-a politique frangaise
d'armement 
- 
subject under study, French
Ministry of Dcfonce, end-1999).
The devclopment phasc is being completed and
the required test firings have takcn place. The
production contract worth approximately FF 8
billion (JDW'? 3016/99) can only go ahcad aftcr
the results of the German budget round are
known and Belgium and the Netherlands have
signed thc contract. First delivcrics of thc
TRIGAT-MR are schcduled for theyear 2002
(JDW 3ot6tee).
The programme is to be managed by OCCAR




Scalp EG or Storm Shadow
(gencral use, long-range cruise
system)
Apache (no area entry version)
France, Unitcd Kingdom, Italy r Matra-BAc Dynamics




r Partnership with Alenia
has becn confirmed.
. Other unconfirmed
o This air-ground missile was initially designed in
an anti-runway version and initial dcliveries are
expccted in 2001. Thc devclopment of the first
Apache lcd to the Scalp EG/Storm Shadow
programme3, which has been in the dcvclopment
phase since 1997.
r The Scalp EG/Storm Shadow programme is a
coordinated Franco-British prograrnme (both
2 JDWiJan.'s lXlerrce W.ekb,.












Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
partnerships possible:
with LFK (Gcrmany) and
Saab (Swedcn).
nations having notificd their own contracts). In
Septcmber 1999, Italy joined thc programme as
an associatc, its participation accompanicd by a
substantial order.
All the missiles meet NATO specifications,
allowing them to be incorporated in standard
aircraft. To date, Apache has been incorporatcd
into the Mirage 2000 and the Tornado. It is
planned to installthe Scalp EG/Storm Shadow





Italy, Spain, Turkcy, Unitcd
Kingdom.
Ifttre A400M is selcctcd, it
will be devcloped by
Airbus Military Company,












The FTA project corresponds to a necd on the
part of Europc for a capacity for autonomous
action and specifically the deploymcnt of armcd
forces over distance. In practical terms, there is
also a need to rcplace thc Transall tactical
transport aircraft in servicc in France and
Germany as from 2005.
Various solutions are bcing considcred by thc
nations involved in the programme:
Airbus Military Company's A400M (Airbus
Military Company is a 5l%-owned
subsidiary of Airbus Industric and thc seven
manufacfu rers rcpresenting thc seven
participant countri es) ;
- 
thc combination of a mixed flcct of American
C-I7 (Boeine) and C-I30 (Lockheed-Martin)
















Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
aircraft procured "ofltle-shelf ' through
competitive tender with the Airbus bid, is
being envisaged by four countrics (Bclgium,
France, Spain and the Unitcd Kingdom);
four countries (France, Gcrmany, Italy and
Spain) are also looking into the possibility of
a new "westernised" version ofthe Antonov
70 (An 70), the product of Russian-
Ukrainian co-operation (L'Armement, No.
66, June 1999, p. 5l et seq.)
Schedule: a decision is expectcd early in 2000.
If the A400M is chosen, contracts could be
notified from February 2000 for deliverics by
end 2005.
On the :rssumption that the A400M is selccted,
the prosrammc willbe broueht into OCCAR
BONUS
anti-tank shcll




o 155 mm top attack artillery projectile for
neutralisation of stationary or moving tanks and
light armoured or othcr automated vehicles.
r Memorandum of Understanding for
development ofthc ordnance signed in 1993.
Contract placed on 15 Octobcr 1993. Start of




Francc, Germany lndustrial project
managcment by GIE
Eurodronc (Matra BAe




. The Brcvcl is a light radar-controlled aircraft
unit or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle designcd to
meet the necds of thc French and German
armies.
o It is to bc uscd for round the clock in-depth
encmy su rveil lance, detcction, reconnai ssance,













Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
and France on a 50/50
basis.
mobile targets and artillery efficiency control.
r France is not to participate in tlc production
phase. However, the Brevel remains one
possible off-the-shelf solution to mect Frcnch
land army nccds from 2002.
. As far as Germany is concerned thc contract for
the industrialisation and production phases was
notified at the end of 1998. First deliveries to
the German army should start in 2001.












r Radar for locating enemy artillery over long
distances and for countcr-battery measures.
o Contract for thc industrialisation phase signed
on 6 March 1998. Technical and opcrational
testing carried out successfully. Deliveries
schcduled from 2001 to 2006.
. Brought under OCCAR in Fcbruary 1999: thc
first OCCAR programme in which the United
Kingdom has takcn part.
EUROFIGHTER 2OOO
fighter aircraft
since 1998 known as the
TYPHOON














Multi-capab i I ity fi ghter ai rcraft . Capabiliti es
include:
beyond visual range air combat;
close-in combat;
(close air support);
suppression of encmy air dcfcnccs (SEAD).
(JDW, 916199, p. 7 I et seq.)
Managed by thc NATO Eurofighter and
Tornado Management Agcncy (NETMA).
Initial orders could lead to deployment of 620
Eurofighters (with an additional option on a























for Germany, 121 for Italy and 87 for Spain) in
three phases scheduled betwecn 2001 and2014
(JDW, 9/611999). The production phase bcgan
in January 1998 with first deliverics cventually
scheduled for June 2002s. A contract for an
initial batch of firm orders for 148 aircraft was
signed in Septcmber 1998. Flight tcsts on 7
prototypes are in progrcss (the aircraft will pass






Germany, Netherlands, Spain ARGE 124 Group
(Gcrmany) consisting of
Blohmc and Voss GmbH,
Howal dtwerkc-Deutsche




5 800 ton multipurpose frigate. Trilateral
agrccment signcd in 1994 for developmcnt and
national construction of thc frigate in cach ofthe
threc countries. Thc agreement covers thc ship's
platform but not thc onboard wcapons systems.
Each country has evolved its own independent
frigate dcsign, although these arc largely
homogcnous. (Sec wcbsite: naval-technology
com).
FOAS
(Futurc Offensi vc Aircraft
System)
Francc, United Kingdom Work being undertaken by
thcjointvcnture sct up for
thc purposc by Dassault
Aviation and British
Aerospace.
. This projcct which was initiated by Francc and
the United Kingdom is still in an exploratory
phase. Propcrly spcaking it is less a programmc
than tcchnological rescarch and joint
dcmonstrators in preparation for a joint fighter
aircraft programmc to rcplace Eurofightcr and
Rafalc. lookine ahcad 20 or 30 ycars6.
EF 2000 or thc Fl6), in Januarj, 2m0.














Proiect name Countries involved lndustrial details Descriotion
o Discussions have started on opening up the

















Ministry of Defcnce, end-
leee)
Optical sonsor space observation systemT. First
generation built by France in partncrship with
Italy and Spain. A first satellite, Helios-lA,
with a contractual lifc of five years, was put into
orbit in mid-1995, a sccond (Helios-lB) will be
launched at the end of 1999. Helios-lA's life
expectancy does not extend beyond 2002-2003
(Opinion I I14, submitted to thc French
National Assembly by Mr Michel, 8/10/98).
France has commitled itself to building a second
gencration of the system, Helios-2, with
considerably enhanced performances. The first
satcllite launch is schcduled for early 2003. (Ia
po li ti que frangai s e d' arme ment - subject under
study, French Ministry of Defcnce, cnd-I999)
Thc programmc remains opcn to other European




France, Italy, Unitcd Kingdom
then
France, Italy






. Project launchcd in 1994 on the basis of
tripartite cooperation between France, Italy and
the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding major
work achievcd by the three nations in frigate
design, at the United Kingdom's initiative, the
7 To dalq 0le lhtio6 srslsn ia lhe only Eulopcan salotlilE ohcrvation sysisn wilh mililary capobility.













Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Descrintion
GEC Maritime (United
Kingdom) andOrizzonte
SpA (Italy), cooperation is
now continuing within a
consortium involving DCN




defence ministcrs of the three countries decided
to end the tripartite arrangement in April 1999.
France and Italy reached an agrecment signed
by the National Armaments Directors in mid-
September lgg9,ta continue the programme on
a bilateral basis.
The United Kingdom is continuing its research
to examine thc possibilitics of cooperation over
sub-assemblies and establish terms for
maximum interoperability bctween the Horizon
and British frigates.
The project, originally estimated at a cost of €15
billion, initially envisaged the constructi on of 22
anti-aircraft frigates (12 for the United
Kingdom, 6 for Italy and 4 for France).
Following British withdrawale, owing to
disagrecmcnts over thc type of vessel that was to
be built, the capabilities of the principal
armamcnts system and the industrial
organisation of the projcct, the Frcnch and
Italians decidcd to produce four frigates (2 per
country) on the basis of a budgct of €3.1 billion.
Thc programme will in any evcnt bc taken over
bv OCCAR.
(Jr{











Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
LRM-NG















The Unitcd Kingdom launchcd thc BVRAAM
programmc for cxtcndcd air-air capability
missiles for Eurofightcr plancs; therc are two
competing bids:
the METEOR Europcan bid:this also
involves the othcr partncr countrics in the
prografirme plus Francc for the Rafalc and
Sweden for the Gripen aircraft. The bid is
bcing submittcd by MBD;
a US bid, lcd by the Amcrican company,
Raythcon, in which only thc Unitcd Kingdom
is interestcd.




I0 Secparagraph I13 of0rc Er?larEtory Mcmorand n lor funhcr infonnalion attoul rEccot rEdrucl[ring ofthe ird$lry in lhc arca ofmi$ilcr.




















France, Germany Euromissile Consortium
(Dasa, LFK, Acrospatialc
Missiles).
MILAN: initially dcveloped for thc Frcnch and
German infantry, Milan is now in servicc in at
least 40 countries. The 3rd generation, Milan 3,
has bcen in service sincc 1996.
HOT: ground-air battleficld dcfence systcm
developed bilaterally (by France and Germany)
starting in the 1960s (first agreement in 1964)
and commissioned in the late 1970's for thc
French and German armies, and in 1987 for the
German air force and navy. ln 1997 it was
chosen by France and Germany to equip the
Franco-Gcrman Tigcr helicopter, pending
commissioning of a long-range anti-tank missile
(the Trigat-LP being a potential candidate).
ROLAND: thc most reccnt bilatcral agrecmcnt,
which entered into force in 1989, dcalt with the
necd to add value to this typc of weapon system.
France notificd its industrialisation phase in late
1997 and delivcries are schedulcd from 2001
onwards. Germany has also decidcd to
modcrnise its Roland wcapons systems for its
army.




Germany, Unitcd Kingdom . After France's
withdrawal from the
progr:unmel2, made
o Fundamental disagreements have prevcntcd
Francc, initially a partner in the launch of thc













Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
MRAV (Multi Role Armourcd
Vehicle/
public in November
1999, the French GIAT








of the fighter vehicle ("Examen des crcdits des
Forces terrestres", Mr Sandricr, Rapporteur,
French National Assembly, 20 I 10199).
The programme, is to be pursued on a bilateral
basis, and managed by OCCAR. It is currcntly
at tlre end of the feasibility study st4ge.
Production will initially be 600 vehicles (300
per nation, worth €750 million) with delivery
scheduled, after a two- year delay, for 2004.
Italy, Spain and Poland have expressed an
interest in taking part in the programme and the
Netherlands wants to join the as a full parfrer










Thomson CSF (247") and
Wass (Alcnia50Yo)
. Bulk orders placcd cnd 1998.
o Programmc currently at production stage.
r End 1998-early 1999: orders placed by Germany
and Denmark.
o\O
























Deutschland and 6.7 Y" by
Fokker Aviation.
ln
France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
expressed a common requirement in 1987 in the
form ofthe NATO Speci/ications Requirement,
to be produced in two versions: the TTH
(factical Transport Helicopter) and NFH
NATO Frigate H elicopter).
The programme is managed by tle NATO
Helicopter Management Agency (NAHEMA) as
far as the design, developmcnt, production and
logistics of the NATO helicopter of the 1990s is
concerned. This agency is responsible for
awarding contracts. The programme is in its
final stage of devclopment with flight tests
having been carried out on four prototypes out
offive.
Negotiations over the industrialisation and
production phases are in progress in preparation
for the signature of a contract for the first batch
of 214 aircraft for the four participant nations
by summer 2000 (of a rcvised total requiremcnt
this summer for 595 aircraft). Initial deliveries
are scheduled for 2004.
NGIFF




Formation on 12 September
1997 ofacompanyunder
German law, Euro-ID
GmbH (Partners: Dasa 58%
and Thomson 42%).
o To contend with needs arising through the
obsolescence ofthe "Identification Friend or Foe
(IFF)" equipmcnt currently in service and with
the threat of elcctronic warfare and
developmcnts in civilian air traffic control in
mind, France and Germany are today cngaged in
a bilateral project (which started in May 1999)
based on a partnership originally cntered into in












Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
o Thc signaturc of the initial contract for
procurement of civilian air-trafftc control
transponders with new S mode capability is
schedulcd for cnd-l 999.
. It is envisaged that this programme will




France, Italy, Unitcd Kingdom Europcan consortium
Europaams SAS is the
industrial progr:rmmc








Systems in Italy and
Matra BAe Dynamics in
thc United Kingdom.
Europaams is in fact
made up of two
conglomerates of which







BAe Dynamics, itself a
Anti-aircraft missile and anti-missile systcm for
the ncw anti-aircraft frigates ofthe threc
nations, the PAAMS system draws hcavily on
thc future surface-air missile family
programmes (FSAF) developcd around thc Astcr
l5 and 30 missilcs in which Francc and Italy,
through collaboration betwccn Acrospatialc,
Thomson-CSF and Alenia, have already
invested some FF l5 billion (US$ 2.5 billion) in
developmcnt loans. FSAF was brought into
OCCAR on 16 Junc 1999.
A contract worth €2.1 billion was awarded to
Europaams in August 1999 for the entirety of
thc projcct. This involvcs an l8-month
predcvclopmcnt phasc followed by a further 6-
year phase for the actual development. (French
National Assembly, Opinion 1864, Vol. V
"Marine" 14/10/99).
Thc initial rcquircmcnts for the partncr countries
were for a fit-out for 12 Royal Navy frigagcs
and 4 and 6 vcsscls respectively for thc Italian
and French naval forces (see Horizon
progr:rmme in this table).
The system is a formative progr:Lmmc for the


















Assembly, Opinion 1864, VoL V "Marine"
I 4/1 0/e9).
o Programme managemcnt undcrtaken by
OCCAR (see also Le Monde, l8l9l99 and
Revue Aerospatiale, No. l6l, Scptember 1999).
POLYPHEM
missilc system





Since 1986, France and Germany havc
pionccrcd thc study of a fibre-optic guided
missilc concept. Italy joined the project in 1994.
Thc TRIFOM fibre-optic guided ground-to-
ground weapons system, based on thc Polyphcm
missilc, is intcnded for the army (so-callcd
artillery version) and can dcliver deep firc over
I arge distances with high-p rcci sion targeting.
Dcvelopment phase currently in progress.
Entry in seryice is schedulcd for around 2005.
Germany would bc interestcd in a naval version







I55 mm howitzer dcvcloped by KMW for tlrc
German army under a contract awarded in 1996
for 185 units out of a total of 600 (for the
German army alonc) up to the year 2002.
A G crman/ltali an col I aborativc vcntu re bctwccn
KMW and Otobrcda, thc programme also


















Proiect name Countries involved Industrial details Description
Joint military communications
system by satellitet3
France o The United Kingdom's withdrawal on 12
August 1998 seriously jeopardised the
continuity of the project. Germany and France
are together studying arrangements for
continued coopcration on a bilatcral basis.
. The possibility of Germany leasing capabilitics
on the first successor satellite to Syracuse 2 is
being looked at.

















today the overall world
leader in helicoptcrs.
The Tiser's MTR 390
New-gcneration fighter helicopter adapted to the
very wide current variety of new scenarios,
intendcd primarily for thc Frcnch and German
armies.
Thcre are two designs:
- 
the (HAP) support-protcction model, choscn
by France;
2 anti-tank variants, selected by France
(HAC) and Germany (Ug-T).
The overall programme quantities are2l5
aircraft for France andZlZ for Germany.
The production contract for an inifial mass-
produced batch was signed in Le Bourgct on l8
June 1999, and covers atotal of 160 aircraft: 80
LIH-T for Germany, T0 HAP and l0 HAC for
France (thc overall Droqr:Lmmc total is 427
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aircraft: 212 for Germany and 215 for France).
Thc programme comes under OCCAR and the
contract is managed by its Tiger Division (y'
"La politique frangaise d'armement", subjcct
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